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Miriam A. Cherry*
INTRODUCTION
Last year, the Huffington Post weblog found itself involved in a
contentious legal dispute with its unpaid bloggers about the
commodification of its content. 1 The Huffington Post features many posts
that are straight-ahead news reports; other posts have featured more
ideological content aimed at a liberal audience. Leading up to the 2008
election, many Huffington Post bloggers wrote accounts critical of thenPresident George W. Bush, specifically his administration‘s treatment of
the Guantanamo Bay prisoners, while others wrote to assist fellow
Democratic voters become more familiar with the primary candidates. 2
Regardless of one‘s personal political leanings, what is certain is that the
website attracted a sophisticated level of writing in its posts. Featured
bloggers included professional journalists and attorneys who contributed
their efforts to the Huffington Post for free, despite normally being paid
for their writing. Freshly updated content helped attract an additional
audience to the blog, which grew rapidly, reaching 15 million hits per
weekday. 3
In March 2011 media giant AOL submitted a $315 million
acquisition bid for the Huffington Post. 4 The web traffic that was driven
to the HuffPo website was valuable to AOL, a company that had been
searching both for more content providers and an expanded audience for
existing content. Arianna Huffington and her financial backers stood to
make a handsome profit from the acquisition. The bloggers, on the other
hand, who had built the blog‘s readership by dint of their hard work, were
Frustrated, Jonathan Tasini, a journalist and labor
to receive nothing. 5
*
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1
See Paul Farhi, Freelancer to File Class-Action Suit Against HuffPo and AOL Over Compensation,
WASHINGTONPOST. COM, Apr. 12, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifesytle/style/freelancer-to-fileclass-action-suit-aainst-huffpost-and-aol-over-compensation/2011/04/12/AFa9QGQD_story.html.
2
See e.g. Shayana Kadidal, Guantanamo, Six Years Later, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2008)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shayana-kadidal/guantanamo-six-years-late_b_81025.html; For the Huffington
Post‘s current stance on this issue, see Ben Fox, Guantanamo Closure Hopes Fade as Prison Turns Ten,
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 10, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/10/guantanamo-closureanniversary_n_1195984.html.
3
Nate Silver, The Economics of Blogging and the Huffington Post, NYTIMES. COM, Feb. 12, 2011,
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/the-economics-of-blogging-and-the-huffington-post/
(estimating 15 million page hits per weekday on HuffPo and analyzing types of posts and attention they
typically were attracting).
4
Id.; see also Julianne Pepitone, Huffington Post blogger sues AOL for $105 million, CNNMONEY. COM,
Apr. 12, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/12/technology/huffington_post_blogger_lawsuit/index.htm.
5
Jeff Berovici, AOL, Arianna Huffington Hit with Class Action Suit, F ORBES. COM, Apr. 12, 2011,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2011/04/12/aol-arianna-huffington-hit-with-class-action-suit/.
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2155232

2

Miriam A. Cherry

[1-Oct-12

activist, 6 along with other unpaid bloggers, filed a lawsuit challenging the
terms of the deal. 7 The bloggers claimed that as their hard work had built
the blog‘s value, they therefore deserved a share of the profits, either
through a contract claim or a claim for unjust enrichment and restitution. 8
The heart of the Huffington Post bloggers‘ claims seemed to rest,
as many contract disputes do, in the differing expectations that the parties
brought with them to the deal. From the bloggers‘ perspective, they
performed work without payment because they believed that they were
contributing to a political website that advanced the causes in which they
believed. Retroactively, they learned that the founders were to profit
from the blog, and they therefore felt taken advantage. 9 On the other
hand, the Huffington Post contended that the bloggers undertook their
writing with no expectation of compensation. Further, they claimed that
the bloggers did receive a substantial benefit, as they used the HuffPo ―to
connect and help their work be seen by as many people as possible. It‘s
the same reason people go on TV shows: to promote their views and
ideas.‖ 10 In other words, according to the HuffPo, the blog provided
unknown writers with an important boon: a platform for expression and
free publicity to a growing audience. 11 On March 30, 2012, the district
court sided with the HuffPo blog and dismissed the bloggers‘ complaint. 12
The decision is now being appealed [Check with court].
While the Huffington Post dispute is a new context for examining
the monetization of Internet websites and online activities, the fact,
however, is that this question – whether a website is or should be
commercialized – is becoming an increasingly common and vexing one.
For in the past decade, technology has fundamentally shaped and
restructured the ways in which many markets function. 13 Indeed, certain
also Tim Rutten, AOL? HuffPo.
The Loser? Journalism, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/09/opinion/la-oe-rutten-column-huffington-aol-20110209 (―To grasp its
business model… you need to picture a galley rowed by slaves and commanded by pirates.‖).
6
Jonathan Tasini was previous the successful lead plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the rights of
newspapers to license the work of freelance writers to electronic databases without additional compensation.
See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (ruling in favor of freelance writers).
7
See Tasini v. AOL Inc., Class Action Complaint, 11 CV 2472 (April 12, 2011) (S.D.N.Y.).
8
The claim would be that, although a formal contract was lacking, the organizers of the Huffington Post
were unjustly enriched and a restitution theory would be applied to compensate the bloggers. Do Huffington
Post Bloggers Deserve to Get Paid?, LAW BLOG, WSJ. COM, (Apr. 12, 2011, 4:01 PM)
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/04/12/should-huffington-post-bloggers-get-paid/tab/print/.
9
The unpaid bloggers posted on the Twitter account #huffpuff, claiming that the HuffPo ―built a blogempire on the backs of thousands of citizen journalists.‖ Ironically, liberal ideology generally tends to support
organized labor and worker‘s rights.
10
Jeremy W. Peters, Huffington Post Is Target of Suit on Behalf of Bloggers, NYTIMES. COM, Apr. 12,
2011,
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/huffington-post-is-target-of-suit-on-behalf-ofbloggers/?pagemode= print.
11
Id. For academic commentary discussing the rise of amateurism and peer production of webblogs, see,
e.g. John Quiggen & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 203, 220
(2008).
12
Tasini v. AOL, __ F.Supp.2d__, 2012 WL 1066893 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
13
For example, computerized trades have replaced the loud, frantic atmosphere of the ―trading pit‖ where
stockbrokers traditionally executed buy-sell orders. See, e.g. Graham Bowley, The New Speed of Money,
Jan.
1,
2011,
Reshaping
Markets,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02speed.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=trading+floor+electronic&st=nyt;
Michael J. De La Merced & Jack Ewing, A German Bid to Take Over the Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EFDC1E30F933A25751C0A9679D8B63&scp=2&sq=tradi
ng+floor+electronic&st=nyt. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J. L. & COM.
509, 509 (1996) (prescient article noting ―the way we think about property is changing in light of the
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goods and services, which in the past were off-limits because they would
have been impracticable to sell or difficult to buy, have been brought to
market by intermediaries such as eBay, 14 Amazon.com, 15 and Craigslist, 16
as these platforms17 have either minimized or removed various transaction
costs.
Further, items that have traditionally been seen as nonmonetizable, such as predictions about future events, 18 tasks performed in
minutes or even seconds of leisure time, 19 or the friendship and
connections that comprise social capital, 20 are all now rapidly in the
process of being valued, monetized, globalized, 21 and marketed online.
At times these shifting boundaries have resulted in legal disputes.
When it comes to commodification on the Internet, it is a wild,
wild World Wide Web. Researching encyclopedia articles for Wikipedia
is an unpaid labor of love, but connecting to your friends on Facebook is
a $100 billion enterprise. 22 Newspaper classified advertisements are
definitely commercial, but their equivalent on Craigslist was mostly noncommercial – until the Delaware Chancery Court stepped in. 23 Selling
your organs is prohibited in the United States, whereas selling hair
technological and social realities of the global flow of digital information over linked computer networks.‖). See
also M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114
PENN STATE L. REV. 809 (2010) (describing psychological literature on how humans are interacting with
robotic devices, such as global mapping programs and roomba housekeepers).
14
EBAY (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.ebay.com. As one of the first online auction websites, eBay has
certainly had its share of commodification controversies. In 1999, the attempted auction of a human kidney on
eBay created a furor and spurred further debate surrounding markets in human organs. See Amy Harmon,
Auction for a Kidney Pops Up on eBay’s Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A13. Citing federal law
criminalizing organ sales, see National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 274e (2007), eBay removed
the auction, but not before bids had reached several million dollars. Since that time, eBay has attracted more
than its share of non-traditional sale items, including ―holy toast,‖ a grilled cheese sandwich with a grill pattern
that reflected the likeness of the Virgin Mary, occult items, and even people putting themselves up for sale.
$28,000 Bid Wins Sandwich, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2004, at 18; “Virgin Mary” Sandwich Sells on eBay for
$28,000: Online Casino Gobbles Up Grilled Cheese Icon, CNN. COM, Nov. 23, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/11/23/ebay.sandwich.ap/index.html; See Mary Ann Georgantopolous, Student’s
eBay Stint Pays the Bills, Makes a Friend, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2007, at 4 (describing vacationing student
who sold himself – or at least one week of his labor – in order to pay for an airline ticket back to the United
States). Which goods and services are considered legitimately for sale, which are jokes, and which are banned
is a seemingly delicate and ever-shifting line implicating issues of public policy, morality, and the doctrines of
common law contracts. As new markets form and transaction costs continue to fall, the boundaries between
market and non-market activity are prone to increased slippage. So while it is legally acceptable for one to sell
the space on his or her forehead to sport a tattoo with the name of a corporation, the literal sale of one‘s soul is
forbidden on Internet auction sites. See Andrew Adam Newman, The Body as Billboard: Your Ad Here, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at B3; Soul Seller, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 2004, at 49 (describing auction for a soul that
slipped past eBay‘s rules; price of a soul in that auction was mere $400).
15
AMAZON (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.amazon.com.
16
CRAIG‘S LIST (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.craigslist.com.
17
I use this term throughout the article even though it has many meanings – a technical platform, a
platform from which to speak, or in the words of one commentator, platforms as the ―curators of public
discourse.‖ See Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of “Platforms,” NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY (2010); Niva ElkinKoren, User-Generated Platforms, WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, DIANE L. Z IMMERMAN & HARRY F IRST, EDS.) (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1648465.
18
See generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ , PREDICTOCRACY (2008) (describing the benefits of prediction
markets). For the author‘s discussion of the legal issues surrounding prediction markets, see Miriam A.
Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First Amendment, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (2008);
Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using Information Markets to Predict
Supreme Court Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 (2006); Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Markets
for Markets: Origins and Subjects of Information Markets, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (2006).
19
Randall Stross, When the Assembly Line Moves Online, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at 5.
20
See infra, note __ and accompanying text.
21
See, e.g. Miriam A. Cherry, The Global Dimensions of Virtual Work, 54 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. J. 471
(2010) (noting increasing trend toward globalization in online work).
22
See Section III(B), infra.
23
See Section III(A), infra.
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promises to rescue third-world citizens from poverty. 24 Selling sex is
illegal as prostitution, but selling adultery online is a hot new business
model. 25 And a small company offering a free service to academics has
quietly become the dominant method for disseminating academic legal
research, quietly beating massive commercial data providers without
anyone initially noticing. 26 This Article explores these and other recent
developments to explore the challenging legal issues raised by Internet
commodification of what is often unpaid labor.
The new technology that has given rise to these unconventional
markets raises provocative legal and theoretical questions. As productive
collaborative uses of the Internet continue to develop, how are the lines
between monetized and free goods and services being drawn in
cyberspace, and how is technology working to shape or change existing
norms about what is and what is not commodified? As new technologies
are being created, disputes arise about how and when marketization could
or should occur. Money can attract participation in ways that purely fun
activities might not be able to, and provide important incentives for
engaging users. On the other hand, the Internet has at its ethos an ―open
access‖ ethic27 that has led to many useful free innovations, with examples
that are as wide-ranging as the development of Linux to free mapping
programs and Wikipedia. 28
It is often difficult to analyze change when it is unfolding and one is
living through it. Much of our current body of contract law doctrine
traces its origins to the rise of mass production and expansion of factory
labor three hundred years ago. 29 The changes in information technology
and commerce that are now taking place are equally as complex and
dramatic as the innovations during the original Industrial Revolution. 30
Accompanying advances in communication and information technology is
a dramatic expansion of online trade and commerce.
As such, it is
important to think of contract law‘s place in this new world of networked
trade and commerce. This Article identifies current developments and
analyzes what types of legal issues these developments may pose for the
future. Some well-established doctrines of contract law may help in
resolving disputes in this diverse wild-web world.
This Article makes a unique contribution to the theoretical work
surrounding commodification. In The Wealth of Networks, Professor
24

See Section I, infra.
See Section II, infra.
26
See Section IV(B), infra.
27
For example, see GOOGLE MAPS (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.googlemaps.com; & MAPQUEST (Mar.
2, 2012) http://www.mapquest.com.
28
WIKIPEDIA. ORG (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.wikipedia.org.
29
For example, the doctrine on the forseeability of contract damages comes to us from the case Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 16 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). As noted by Professor Richard Danzig, the case was part of
a sea change in commerce that came along with the advent of mass production. See Richard Danzig, Hadley v.
Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 249, 252 (1975).
30
One contemporary of the English Industrial Revolution wrote the following in describing the changes
and the effect that had on the law of commerce: ―What our Law was then [before the Industrial Revolution], it
is not now; and what is now, can best be understood by seeing what it was, then. It is like the comparison
between England under former, and present, systems of transit, for persons, property, and intelligence:
between the days of lumbering wagons, stage coaches, and a creeping post – and of swift, luxurious railroads
and lightening telegraphs. All is altered: material, inducing corresponding moral and social changes.‖ S.
WARREN, A POPULAR AND PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAW STUDIES 12 (3d ed. 1863).
25

1-Oct-12]

Cyber Commodification

5

Yochai Benkler extols the virtues of free collaboration in cyberspace, via
what he describes as open-source or ―commons-based peer
preoduction.‖ 31 Professor Margaret Radin also expresses skepticism about
markets in relation to unconventional markets. On a first examination,
choices about commodification seem binary – an on or off switch – and as
such they are in fundamental tension. With a deeper examination,
however, I believe this is a false dichotomy. Commodication is more of a
continuum, with many portions of the Internet existing in states of what
Radin might term ―incomplete commodification.‖ 32 While Professors
Benkler and Radin are skeptical of marketization of the Internet, that
skepticism is, in my view, mostly unjustified. There is nothing about the
Internet that inherently means that it must be free. In fact, it is my
contention that contests and disputes arise not because of commodification
itself but because of misunderstandings about the degree of
commodification surrounding a particular transaction.
With the
appropriate qualifications and limits that will be pointed out throughout
the Article, monetization need not be as problematic, as these two
scholars seem to assume.
Keeping this thesis in mind, while scholars have provided narrow
telescopic glimpses into isolated components of cyber commodification,
this piece aims to catalogue and describe these issues further. At the
outset, I note that cyber commodification is a multivalent concept that
does not lend itself to easy analysis or description. The term cyber
commodification as I employ it refers to a number of ideas, including
creating new markets for goods or services on the Internet that have not
existed before; monetizing items that we would not normally think of as
financial concepts, such as friendship, or two seconds of someone‘s time,
or someone‘s individual predictions about the future; creating business
models that attempt to harness what would traditionally be unpaid labor
and what commentators have referred to as ―peer production‖; or
leveraging or arbitraging the differing values of goods or services based
on the absence of geographic boundaries on the Internet. As this is a
complex and new phenomenon, the rest of this Article seeks to provide a
rough exploratory map of this new terrain.
In order to map the concept of cyber commodification more fully,
the rest of this paper is structured as a systematic analysis of the concept
31
See, e.g. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 9 (2006) (―As collaboration among far-flung
individuals becomes more common, the idea of doing things that require cooperation with others becomes much
more attainable, and the range of projects individuals can choose as their own therefore qualitatively increases.
The very fluidity and low commitment required of any given cooperative relationship increases the range and
diversity of cooperative relations people can enter, and therefore of collaborative projects they can conceive of
as open to them.‖). See also Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer
Production, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963 (2009).
32
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); see also Margaret Jane
Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction, The Subject and Object of Commodification, RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION 25 (MARTHA ERTMAN & JOAN C. WILLIAMS EDS., 2005) (Radin is ―convinced that [her] most
useful scholarly contribution is likely to be having made the word ‗commodification‘ speakable in legal academic
discourse.‖). Indeed, as early as 2002, Professor Margaret Jane Radin, a pioneer of commodification theory in
legal literature, noted that the Internet and other computer technology was helping to accelerate various types of
commodification by lowering transaction costs and bringing buyers and sellers together in a truly global
marketplace. Margaret Jane Radin, Incomplete Commodification in the Computerized World, in THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 4 (NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL EDS., 2002).
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in five parts, using both illustrative examples and broader theoretical
material. Part One explains how cyber commodification is different from
earlier forms of commodification that are more familiar to us. As such it
seeks insights from the first wave of commodification theory that grew out
of advances in medical technology that enabled us to think about
reproduction, organ sales, and other biologic components associated with
the body in market terms. From this more historical and theoretical
background, Part Two discusses the forces that have propelled cyber
commodification. These forces include anonymity, the elimination of
geographical barriers, and the lack of jurisdictional guidelines that apply
to the Internet. While the examples in this section range all the way from
an online market for adultery to Chinese ―goldfarmers‖ who play video
game characters for a living, what they all share in common is that they
explain why the cyber commodification phenomenon has become
ubiquitous.
In Part Three, I discuss the process of cyber
commodification, using the business model of craigslist as an illustrative
example as well as examining prediction markets, which monetize
knowledge and information. Part Four moves on to contests and disputes
that have arise from differing expectations that parties bring with them
into various transactions. Finally, in Part Five, I discuss the greater
implications of cyber commodification, including its various associated
costs and benefits.
I.

Differentiating Cyber Commodification

Previously, scholars have studied and analyzed commodification of
goods and services, with a great deal of attention focusing on nontraditional or controversial markets, such as markets in surrogacy or the
sale of organs or body parts. Some of these unconventional categories
push the boundaries of what most in our society would consider off-limits
or problematic. In the literature unconventional markets are thus oftreferred to as ―taboo trades,‖ ―repugnant markets,‖ 33 or, humorously,
―ick-onomics.‖ 34 While these matters have been at least partially analyzed
by courts and academic commentators, the markers between monetized
and non-monetized transactions are still being clarified. Indeed, it is
important to realize that these delineations are often contextually and
culturally dependent. For example, payment for organs is forbidden in
the United States, but is permitted in Iran; 35 markets in fossils are
outlawed in many European countries, but they thrive in the lightly
regulated market of the United States. 36 So, what can we learn from these
examples for our present purposes of exploring cyber commodification?
33

Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3 (Summer 2007).
Id.
35
Alex Tabarrok, The Meat Market, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2010, at A1; Alex Altman & Claire Suddath,
How
does
Kidney-Trafficking
Work?,
TIME. COM,
July
27,
2009,
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1912880,00.html.
36
Miriam A. Cherry, A Tyrannosaurus-Rex Aptly Named “Sue”: Using a Disputed Dinosaur to Teach
Contract Defenses, 82 N.D. L. REV. 295 (2005) (describing lightly regulated fossil markets in the United
States).
34
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Further, what are the differences between these offline commodification
concerns and what is happening now online? Specifically, how have
markets responded to previous technological changes? How did the law
play a role in the creation or inhibition of the markets? In order to
examine these questions, a brief general background of the legal
doctrines, and then a short literature review is helpful.
A. Existing Legal Framework for Regulation of New Markets
As a broad overview, U.S. federal and state laws police the border
of marketable goods and services. On the first order are constitutional
provisions, such as the Thirteenth Amendment, 37 and statutes that
criminalize, forbid, or otherwise ban markets in a particular good or
service. These provisions are sometimes dependent on context, and may
shift over time along with the changing morals of the day. In addition,
many statutes set the ground rules for participation in markets or attempt
to protect vulnerable participants, 38 although these statutes are more about
regulation than forbidding particular market activity. Finally, other
common law legal doctrines, such as public policy, consideration, and the
concept of inalienability in property law operate within common law to
establish the line between permissible market versus non-market activity. 39
Constitutional provisions or criminal statutes can put certain activities
off-limits for exchange in a market. 40 Constitutional provisions can be
used to outlaw an entire market for a good entirely, such as was the case
with the prohibition of alcohol. 41 Criminal statutes may also be written in
such a way that make an entire market illegal; or it may be context
dependent. For example, many drugs that once were legal, such as
But other banned drugs, specifically
cocaine, are now banned. 42
marijuana, are permissible with the presence of particular medical
conditions in certain states. 43 Sexual activity, which would otherwise be
legal is criminalized if it involves the exchange of money. 44 And Federal
37
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011).
38
See generally Joel Seligman, The Changing Nature of Securities Regulation, 6 WASH. U. J. J. L. &
PUB. Pol‘y 205 (2001).
39
Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
40
See, e.g. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Ensnared, WALL ST. J.,
July 23-24, 2011, at A1 (describing father and son who were arrested for digging arrowheads on federal land).
41
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI) (instituting prohibition along with
the Volstead Act). See also Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars – Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First
Amendment, The Commerce Clause, and Consumers’ Rights, 38 AM. BUS. L. J. 1 (2000); Lloyd C. Anderson,
Direct Shipment of Wine, The Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment: A Call for Legislative
Reform, 27 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2004).
42
See, e.g. NICK REDING, METHLAND THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AN AMERICAN SMALL TOWN (2010).
43
See, e.g. Michael Berkey, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal Tango, 9 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 417 (2011).
44
Anti-prostitution laws criminalize the payment of money for sexual services. However, this rule is also
context-dependent and produces odd results in its application at times. While payment for sexual services is
banned in prostitution, producers of pornography legally pay performers for their appearance in sexually
explicit films, which include payment for sexual services. See Taylor v. State, 167 Ariz. 429, 808 P.2d 314
(Ariz.Ct.App. 1990). See also Andrew Gilden, Sexual (Re)Consideration: Adult Entertainment Contracts and
the Problem of Encforceabillity, 96 GEO. L. J. 541 (2007). Recently, Prof. SpearIt Maldonado has argued that
the justification for the distinction between prostitution and pornography is a flimsy one, since both constitute
the commodification of sexual services. As such, the criminalization of prostitution treats those in like
situations unequally, in fact criminalizing the activity for those of lower socio-economic class. SpearIt
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anti-gambling laws have recently been strengthened as a reaction to the
growth of Internet gambling. 45
In other instances, state or federal statutes do not prevent a market
from existing or activity from taking place, but instead they regulate who
may participate in the market or otherwise prescribe rules to which market
participans must adhere. At times the regulation largely replicates the
role of custom46 but in other instances regulations exist for advancing
consumer or investor protection. Examples of such statutes include the
Magnuson-Moss Act, 47 which governs the form and structure of
warranties provided for consumer goods, or the rules regarding accredited
investors under the Securities and Exchange Act. 48
Even when there is no applicable statute explicitly criminalizing or
regulating a market, the common law doctrines of consideration and
public policy may play a role in market regulation. The touchstone of
contract law is the bargained-for-exchange, the reciprocal inducement of
consideration as described by Oliver Wendell Holmes. 49 Long the bane of
first-year law students, the doctrine is littered with moral commitments, 50
and promises to make charitable donations. 51 While not often litigated, 52
the doctrine of consideration performs an important policing function in
terms of decisions about what kinds of trades will be enforceable, and thus
legitimately part of a market economy, and those trades that are
unenforceable. Public policy is another ill-defined doctrine, 53 but it too
has formed the basis for striking down particular private bargains. 54 From
this broad legal overview, I turn now to a literature review of
commodification theory.
B. Scholarly Analysis of Commodification
In the last two decades, legal scholarship has tried to theorize coherent
doctrinal approaches to the regulation of markets in human tissues and
organs, 55 sex, 56 surrogate pregnancy, 57 and even the online sale of
Maldonado, Pornography and Prostitution (unpublished draft on file with author).
45
Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First Amendment, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 833 (2008).
46
Indeed, one commentator has noted that certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act inscribed into law
the ―best practices‖ that existed at the time. See, e.g. Lawrence Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
47
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 106(b), 88 Stat. 2183,
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2306 (2006)).
48
Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2006); Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd.
Partnerships Securities Litigation, 815 F.Supp 620, 630-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the purpose of the
Securities and Exchange Act in exempting those who qualify as accredited investors is to facilitate specially
designed offerings while also protecting against the danger posed by the lack of SEC scrutiny of offer and sale).
49
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE C OMMON LAW 230 (MARK DEWOLFE HOWE ED., BELKNAP PRESS OF
HARVARD UNIV. PRESS 1963) (1881).
50
Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
51
Johnson v. Otterbein Univ., 41 Ohio St. 527 (Oh. 1885).
52
Among practitioners, the doctrine of consideration would generally be considered a ―deadletter‖ since
consideration is present in almost all commercial deals with which a transactional attorney would have to deal.
53
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Penn. Comm. Pleas 1957).
54
Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 179
(1981).
55
See, e.g. Michele Goodwin, Empires of the Flesh: Tissue and Organ Taboos, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1219,
1221-22 (2009) (arguing for compensation to family members to increase organ supply rather than modifying
default rules of donation); Lisa Milot, What are We – Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment
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virginity. 58 Over thirty years ago, Elisabeth M. Landes and Richard
Posner sparked widespread controversy when they began writing about
the creation of markets for child adoption. 59 Proposals surrounding
markets for human organs have also sparked serious debate. 60
Feminist theorists have been at the forefront of this commodification
discussion, perhaps because some of these markets have gender
implications, concern the body, or concern women‘s traditional roles,
which were historically outside and apart from paid labor markets. 61
Many of these theorists were concerned with the dignitary aspects of these
trades, and argued that women‘s bodies and reproductive capacities should
not the subject of trade or market pressures. Other feminists were
concerned about the exploitation of poor women by the wealthy,
sometimes based on racial lines or based on development status of the
countries in which women lived.
Some were concerned that the
monetization of reproductive capacity could only lead to further
exploitation.
Although there are a number of conflicting discussions and
assumptions surrounding the development of commodification of the
body, opponents of commodification in these areas voice arguments that
touch on two general areas of concern. First, there is a concern that
markets can be coercive and play on the desperation that arises from
abject poverty and economic inequality. 62 Second, opponents argue that
commodification will corrupt basic human values, meaning that ―certain
moral and civic goods are diminished or corrupted if bought and sold for
money.‖ 63 In other words, particular markets might impair the value of
human life and, perhaps, dignity. While the first argument looks to the
ideal of consent, the dignity argument examines the type of goods on offer
and questions whether the purchase and sale of those goods will produce
good results for society overall. 64
Other feminist theorists, including Professors Katharine Silbaugh65 and
of Transfers of Human Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 (2010) (proposing tax reforms to
address various types of transactions in body materials). In her work The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks,
author Rebecca Skloot invites the reader to contemplate some of the questions involved with the
commercialization of human tissues. See generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA
LACKS (2010).
56
MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) 132.
57
See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 67 (2007).
58
Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1739-40 (2010) (recounting story of
2008 virginity auction at Moonlite Bunny Ranch in Nevada).
59
See, e.g. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1978); RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). The secondary literature that has developed in
response to this provocative argument has been extensive. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and
Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203 (2009) (collecting sources).
60
See Roth, supra note 32. See also Emily C. Lee, Trading Kidneys for Prison Time: When Two
Contradictory Legal Traditions Intersect, Which One has the Right-Of-Way?, 43 U.S.F.L REV. 507, 508
(2009) (describing proposed bill in South Carolina that would have provided good time credit for prisoners who
became kidney donors, S.B. 480, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C.2007)).
61
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION (MARTHA ERTMAN & JOHN C. WILLIAMS, EDS. 2005).
62
Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, The Moral Limits of Markets, RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION 122 (MARTHA ERTMAN & JOAN C. WILLIAMS EDS., 2005).
63
Id. at 124.
64
Id.
65
Martha Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/ Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
REV. 79 (2001).
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Martha Ertman66 have argued in favor of commodification more generally,
proposing that familial relations would be more equitable if they were to
be viewed in monetized terms. Indeed, Professor Kimberly Krawiec has
advocated for the monetization of certain of these taboo trades, arguing
that legalization and monetization of the sexual economy could lead to
women‘s empowerment and more full participation in the market
economy. 67
While these various arguments in favor or against commodification of
the body resound in arguments based on either equality or autonomy,
Professor Joan Williams notes that perhaps this is a false dichotomy. 68
Rather than a fully market transaction or a wholly non-commodified one,
Williams suggests that all transactions fall on some part of a continuum,
which she terms ―differentiated ties.‖ 69 Some amount of commodification
of our private lives is inevitable, according to Williams, and rather than
focus on judging whether this is appropriate or not, she asks several key
questions. Williams exhorts us to be concerned with whether the end
result of the commodification is liberating, who controls the process of
marketing and receives the proceeds, and whether the commodification
advances or harms social ties. 70 While ―differentiated ties‖ is an awkward
terminology that does not seem to capture fully Williams‘ concept, the
questions she poses are important, and I will return to these insights in the
last portion of the Article.
How does the further development of Internet technology have an
impact on some of these unconventional markets? What is marketable has
always been contextually and culturally dependent, and has been subject to
change over time, apart from any changes in the technological
mechanisms for market exchange. But particular aspects of this new
technology have their own dynamic that seem to encourage
commodification.
Would even Landes and Posner have predicted an
online market for human hair?71 In dealing with sales that concern the
body, the Internet seems to reduce transaction costs. These reduced
transaction costs can take the form of an intermediary website acting as
platform. The legitimacy and acceptability that such an intermediary
conveys may encourage particular types of transactions to become
commodified, and perhaps seem more acceptable. To ask the converse
question, however, how does the theory surrounding the first generation
66

Katherine Silbaugh, Marriage contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 65 (1998).
Krawiec, supra note 57 at 1768-69.
Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify That Is Not the Question, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 368 (MARTHA ERTMAN & JOAN C. WILLIAMS EDS., 2005).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 375-77.
71
On BuyandSellHair.com, sellers can create listings for their hair, including color and length. See
Listings for Hair for Sale, BUYANDSELLHAIR, COM, http://buyandsellhair.com/ad-category/hair-for-sale/ (last
visited, Mar. 2, 2012). While in developed countries this may not be big business, in developing countries the
sale of hair can forestall abject poverty. For example, in Eastern Europe, some children sell their hair for
$3.20 to buy food, and the hair is then sold in the United Kingdom and the United States for thousands of
dollars. See Eddie Fitzmaurice, Children Sell Their Hair for $3, THE SUN-HERALD, Feb 22, 2004. On the
other end of the spectrum, many choose to make donations of their hair, through organizations such as Locks
of Love, to those who need it due to various illnesses or chemotherapy. Mission & Vision, LOCKS OF LOVE,
http://www.locksoflove.org/mission.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). Note that wigs are not covered by most
health insurance plans, as they are considered cosmetic.
67
68
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of commodification analyses have applicability for the questions of
Internet commodification? Let us to turn to some examples that illustrate
the forces pushing toward cyber commodification, and we will return to
the theoretical matters when discussing the implications of cyber
commodification in the last portion of the Article.
II.

Forces Propelling Cyber Commodification

Several exogenous forces have made cyber commodification
increasingly prevalent. These forces are directly related to several
distinctive traits of the very Internet itself – the ability for market
participants to maintain anonymity, reduction in transaction costs, the
increasing irrelevance of geography and even national borders, and the
lack of clear jurisdictional boundaries. These forces can best be described
through accompanying illustrative examples.
For anonymity, this
discussion takes the form of an online market for adultery and child
naming. For transaction costs and the decreasing relevance of geography,
I discuss virtual work and a new method of financing start-up businesses
known as crowdfunding.
A. Anonymity
Anonymity encourages the growth of cyber commodification.
According to a recent article, ―[a]nonymity and pseudonymity are intrinsic
to, and inseparable from, cyberspace, because a computer serves as a
medium through which interaction is facilitated . . . [T]he identity of each
individual is removed either completely or in part.‖72 Both the concepts of
anonymity and deindividuation have been used as frameworks to analyze
the proliferation of various types of conduct in cyberspace including
defamation,73 software piracy,74 gambling,75 and harassment and cyberbullying.76
Numerous studies indicate that people behave differently when they
believe their identity is anonymous.77 However, the role anonymity plays in
72
Sameer Hinduja, Deindividuation and Internet Software Privacy, 11 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 391,
392 (2008).
73
Rowland, supra note 54.
74
Hinduja, supra note 71.
75
Mark Griffiths et al., Internet Gambling: An Overview of Psychosocial Impacts, 10 UNLV GAMBLING &
RES. J. 27 (2006).
76
Daniel Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Warren Chik, Harrassment Through
the Digital Medium A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparative Analysis on the Law of Cyberstalking, 3 J. OF INT‘L COM.
L. & TECH. 13 (2008); Cf. Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 113 (describing ways in which negative terms
can be searched).
77
See e.g. Katherine S. Williams, On-Line Anonymity, Deindividuation and Freedom of Expression and
Privacy, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 687, 691 (2006) (citing GUSTAV LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR
MIND (Transaction Publishers 1995) (1895)); M.E. Kabay, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace:
Deindividuation, Incivility and Lawlessness Versus Freedom and Privacy at the Annual Conference of the
European
Institute
for
Computer
Anti-virus
Research
(Mar.
16,
1998)
available
at
http://www.mekabay.com/overviews/anonpseudo.pdf, (citing Phillip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice:
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a person‘s decision-making is subject to debate. One predominant theory78
within the psychological literature is deindividuation, ―or the state of
alienation, reduced inhibition, and lack of self-awareness which occurs
when a personal sense of identity is overwhelmed by that of the group.‖79
Early research focused on an individual losing self-awareness due to
participation in a large group.80 However, even absent group membership,
anonymity may be a contributing factor to deindividuation because
anonymity results in a lack of self-awareness.81 This resulting lack of selfawareness can lead to disinhibited or anti-normative behavior.82 For
example, from the relative anonymity of his or her car, a driver is more
likely to exhibit road rage,83 a participant in an experiment is more likely to
deliver a higher voltage of electric shock to his co-participant if his face is
concealed,84 and anonymous students are more likely to write cruel
comments about instructors in their teaching evaluations.85
Evidence supporting a causal link between anonymity and certain
behavior on the Internet is lacking, but several otherwise important
observations regarding anonymity and Internet behavior exist. For instance,
anonymity is rationally chosen by people who do not want to be held
accountable for their decision making.86 Anonymity allows individuals to
engage in a behavior without the fear of stigma associated with that
Further, individuals may act online without receiving
behavior.87
disapproval or judgment.88
Most importantly, computer-mediated
Individuation, Reason and Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON
MOTIVATION (W.J. Arnold & D. Levine, eds., University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln) 1969)).
78
Social Identity Theory of Deindividuation (SIDE) is particularly relevant in the Internet context. SIDE
divides the self into two subgroups: (1) personal - - the qualities that make an individual different from others; and
(2) social - - the groups the individual belongs to and the identity of that person within the groups. Williams,
supra note 54, at 693. Deindividuation results when an individual abandons the personal identity for the social
identity and the norms and frames or reference from different groups. Williams supra note 54, at 693. While
anonymity may not cause anti-normative behavior, it can facilitate acting on an impulse or lower inhibitions
which allows a person to behave in a way she would not if not anonymous. John Suler, The Online Disinhibition
Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 321, 322 (2004). Most likely, anonymity is simply the best option for
someone predisposed to anti-normative behavior, because it is less likely that he or she will get caught. Katherine
S. Williams, Using Tittle’s Control Balance Theory to Understand Computer Crime and Deviance, 22 INT‘L REV.
OF L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 145, 146 (2008).
79
Diane Rowland, Griping, Bitching and Speaking Your Mind: Defamation and Free Expression on the
Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 519, 531 (2006) (citing S. Reicher, R.M. Levine, and E. Gordijn, More on
Deindividuation, Power Relations Between Groups and the Expression of Social Identity, 37 BRIT. J. OF SOC.
PSYCHOL. 15 (1998).
80
Id. at 531.
81
See Edward Diener, Deindividuation: Causes and Consequences, 5 SOCIAL BEHAVIOR & PERSONALITY
143, 145-146 (1977) (citing Zimbardo).
82
Id. at 149.
83
Williams, supra note 54 at 692 (citing P. Ellison, Anonymity and Aggressive Driving Behaviour: A Field
Study, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 256 (1995)).
84
Id. (citing Zimbardo).
85
Mary W. Lindhal & Michael L. Unger, Cruelty in Student Teaching Evaluations, 58 COLLEGE TEACHING
71, 73 (2010).
86
Williams, supra note 54, at 696.
87
Griffiths et al., supra note 17, at 30.
88
Id.
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communication brings individuals into on-line groups where they may
potentially act on the norms espoused by the group, thereby losing their
sense of self-awareness.89 For the sake of balance, it is also important to
point out the positive aspects of anonymity: people living under oppressive
political regimes may seek out information from the rest of the world, and
may allow for critique of the government without fear of repercussions.
Anonymity can allow for more personal freedom – for better or worse.
Currently, the most significant commentary about anonymity,
deindividuation and behavior on the Internet is in the context of free speech
and defamation.90 Commentary has focused on harassment and its
proliferation due to the anonymity of cyberbullies.91 The Internet and other
technological advances allow bullying to continue around the clock,
anonymously, and more maliciously.92 With a feeling of anonymity, bullies
on the Internet act on impulse without reflection.93 As one commentator
has noted, ―technology allows bullies to be meaner, more frequently, with
more allies, before an inestimable audience. It gives them a greater sense of
invincibility and inhibits their fear of being caught or punished.‖94
Compared to these free speech and criminal law aspects, relatively little
analysis is available on how anonymity drives commodification. As many
markets in cyberspace feature anonymous or semi-anonymous
transactions, my contention is that they may encourage non-traditional
markets to form. Aside from facilitating purchases, markets also are
socially constructed spaces, and in a capitalist economy, they play a vital
role in social interactions. Consider the local souk in a rural agricultural
village. The market brings buyers and sellers together to interact in a
social space – they can commiserate about crop failures, animals, and
perhaps learn about larger market trends as they talk amongst themselves.
The participants will know each other personally, and will be repeat
players.
Participants in an online market, however, act in ways vastly different
from the way they would in a village souk. With technology, market
participants have little or no information to tell them with whom they are
dealing. To substitute for the face-to-face interaction between buyers and
89

Williams, supra note 54, at 693.
See generally Susanna Moore, The Challenge of Internet Anonymity: Protecting John Doe on the Internet,
26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L 469 (2009); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What
Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1372 (2009); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:
Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000).
91
See generally Darby Dickerson, Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 51 (2005); Citron, supra
note 75.
92
See Id., at 56; Mark Franek, Rise of the Cyberbully Demands New Rules, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May
10, 2004, at 9; Glenn R. Stutzky, Cyber Bullying Information, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL
RESEARCH,
http://www.ippsr.msu.edu/Documents/Forums/2006_Mar_CYBER_BULLYING_INFORMATION_2006%20-%20Provided%20by%20Mr.%20Glenn%20Stutzky.pdf (last visited Sep. 29, 2011);
93
Franek, supra note 91.
94
Id.
90
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sellers, other proxies for trust have emerged via intermediaries. 95 For
example, buyer and seller ratings on platforms such as eBay and
Amazon.com may signal to the other party whether a participant is
trustworthy. If goods are shipped late, damaged, or broken, a seller may
receive poor ratings, which would warn other purchasers to steer clear of
that merchant. 96
In the past, if a buyer wanted to purchase a good or service from the
―gray market,‖ or even a good or service that might be legal, but was
perhaps unsavory, it was difficult to make that purchase anonymously.
Certain types of alcoholic beverages could only be purchased in certain
places, from approved retailers, on particular days and times; alcohol
bottles were hidden from view in brown paper bags. The same is true of
pornography or sexual aids. 97 If a person physically had to go out in
public to a store in order to purchase such an item, there was the risk that
they would be seen by a co-worker, friend or neighbor. Along with the
purchase came the further risk that the purchaser might be judged or
ridiculed. Today, with anonymous online shopping, purchasers can buy
anything from the most innocuous to the most embarrassing of items
without revealing their identities. Removing the inhibitions associated
with providing one‘s name means many items can be monetized that
would have been unthinkable before.
The concepts of anonymity and deindividuation therefore become
central to any discussion of cyber commodification. Anonymity lends to
the proliferation of taboo markets for two reasons. If a participant in a
taboo market does not want to be identified or held accountable for his or
her participation in the marketplace, then the anonymity offered by the
Internet is the sensible and rational medium for his or her transaction. The
Internet offers greater anonymity than face-to-face marketplaces, therefore,
a participant, if concerned with stigma or judgment, will conduct his or her
transaction anonymously on the Internet.
As an additional matter, Internet marketplaces may display a particular
culture or promote non-normative behavior. If a specific website or
marketplace invites an individual to join a group, the individual‘s
membership in the group may cause a loss of self-awareness and
deindividuation. Membership on a website that then promotes a particular
kind of unconventional marketplace could lead some individuals to a loss of
self-awareness and deindividuation. Here I focus on two unconventional
markets are driven by anonymity, the online market for adultery and the
market for baby naming rights.
95

(2006).
96

Lior Strahlavitz, “How’s My Driving?” For Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699

(Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.ebay.com.
Indeed, pornography does a brisk business, with $2.8 billion estimated business per year online. Jon
Swartz,
Purveyors
of
Porn
Scramble
to
Keep
Up
with
Internet,
U.S.A.
TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/industry/2007-06-05-internet-porn_N.htm, June 12, 2007.
97

EBAY
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The Market for Adultery

With its branding tagline, ―Life is short, Have an affair,‖ 98 the dating
website Ashley Madison focuses on a specific demographic: those who
are married. 99 In the United States, the user demographic of the website
is heavily male; but in Australia, where prostitution is legal, and married
men often patronize prostitutes, married women often avail themselves of
the website. 100 Before the advent of the Internet, those who were seeking
to have an extra-marital affair could not trumpet their desires; a personal
advertisement in a newspaper could lead to discovery by a spouse. The
Ashley Madison website, therefore, thrives on promoting a sense of
anonymity in its users‘ affairs.
While posting a profile on the Ashley Madison website is free,
contacting other members requires payment. 101 Users can look at other
member‘s profiles and ―test the waters,‖ but if they want to initiate
contact, they have to purchase access. 102 Credit card charges show up
under the name of an innocuous sounding business, so as not to alert a
suspicious spouse that money is being spent on a dating website. 103
Customers can also pay using other means, such as a money order,
electronic funds transfer from their bank, or pre-paid gift card. 104 These
alternate methods of payment help a customer keep his or her use of the
website hidden from a partner or spouse.
Ashley Madison‘s business model depends on promoting a sense of
anonymity among its users; and the website therefore strongly promotes
the concept of privacy and anonymity as a key selling point for their
customers. The home page for the website features a woman holding her
finger over her lips, illustrating the privacy the website offers. 105 The
tagline under the website reads, ―The world‘s leading married dating
service for discreet encounters,‖ with the word discreet emphasized. 106 A
Time article discussed the latest marketing tactic used by
AshleyMadison.com and other similar websites: mobile cheating. 107 The
websites have created mobile applications or ―apps‖ to allow users to search
online profiles via their cellular phones without leaving suspicious
electronic trails on their home computer.108 Anonymity on the Internet,
however indirectly, has led to the monetization of adultery.

98
99

ASHLEY MADISON, http://www.ashleymadison.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
Id.

100
101

Id.
Id.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Jeremy Caplan, Cheating 2.0: New Mobile Apps Make Adultery Easier, TIME, June 29, 2009, available
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1909602,00.html.
108
Id.
102
103
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2. Baby Names and Branding Rights
Another example of anonymity facilitating the development of a
market can be seen in the purchase and sale of baby naming rights. On
the Internet, markets have arisen to facilitate naming and branding.
Selling naming rights to your child most probably would be seen as odd in
a small community where everyone knows each other. So odd in fact,
that it might even be seen as a matter that should be prevented by law.
After all, most people name their children in a way that is meaningful
within their family, or perhaps to give honor to an historical figure, not
treated as a way to make money. Despite that, today some parents are
selling the rights to name their children online. 109
There is historical precedent addressing the sale of baby names in
the context of consideration doctrine. In an influential 1882 case, Wolford
v. Powers,110 the Indiana Supreme Court held that the right to name a child
constituted good consideration. In that case, an elderly friend of the family
promised the sum of $10,000 to help the family‘s younger son complete his
education, but asked in return that the child be named after him. Although
to a certain extent, this looked to the Court like a gift to the child, the Court
reasoned that the father did give up the right to name his son, and that
naming rights, in other contexts, such as a named university endowed chair,
did have value.111 Thus the court enforced the promise, holding that
consideration existed.112 A decade later in Diffenderfer v. Scott, an Indiana
Appeals Court treated the consideration question as settled, quoting Wolford
v. Powers.113 Similar decisions in other jurisdictions followed resting
upon the same logic. 114
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted
the Wolford precedent, noting in Eaton v. Libbey, a 1896 case, that ―[w]e
have no doubt that the privilege of naming a child is a valid consideration
for a promise. . . Gifts to a child because of its name are common, and a
change of name is often made the condition of a gift or bequest. ‖ 115
Further, in 1914, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted in
Gardner v. Denison that the ―privilege of naming a child is a valid
consideration for a promise to pay money . . . [the child] loses the
109
What’s in a Name? Four Thousand Fifty Dollars, F REAKONOMICS. COM,
http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/01/21/whats-in-a-name-four-thousand-and-fiftydollars/?scp= 1&sq= baby+ naming+ rights&st= nyt (last visited April 4, 2011).; Matthew Purdy, Our Towns;
A Boy Named Soup, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/01/nyregion/our-towns-aboy-named-soup.html?scp= 3&sq= baby+ naming+ rights&st= nyt; Joshua Rhett Miller, Woman Blames eBay
for Thwarting Baby Name Auction, FOX NEWS, Aug.13, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,539311,00.html.
110

Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294 (Ind. 1882).
Id. at *7.
Id.
113
Diffenderfer v. Scott, 5 Ind.App. 243 (Ind. App. 1892).
111
112

114
See, e.g. Daily v. Minnick, 60 L.R.A. 840, 914 (Iowa 1902); Babock v. Chase, 36 N.Y.S. 879 (Sup.
Ct. 1895); Shumm by Whyner v. Berg, 231 P.2d 39, 44 (Cal. 1951) (collecting cases).
115
Eaton v. Libbey, 165 Mass. 218, 220 (Mass. 1896).

1-Oct-12]

Cyber Commodification

17

opportunity or receiving a more advantageous name, and is compelled to
bear whatever detriment may flow from the name imposed upon him.‖ 116
While at first, the possibility of ―detriment‖ flowing from a name may
seem somewhat odd - other than in playground teasing - the popular book
Freakonomics discusses, at length, the fact that certainly names may
actually lead to better job and financial prospects than others. 117
Many of these well-established precedents, however, involved a
close relationship between an older, wealthier individual, at times with a
blood tie with the family, and who was often a widow or widower without
children. For example, in Gardner v. Denison, the court mentions that
the elderly man who made the promise regarding the child‘s name was
taken care of in his or her declining years by the child‘s parents. 118
However, after the will was read, no provision had been made for the
child that had been named after him. 119 In this way, some of the
―bargains‖ that were struck around the child‘s name seem like another
way of formalizing extended familial and caretaking relationships.
Modern day online auctions of naming rights to children, however,
are structured as impersonal arms-length transactions. Rather than
looking like an arrangement to shore up extended familial relationships,
these auctions look more like desperate pleas for money. The bids are
from parents in difficult financial circumstances who might be willing to
name their child ―Xanax‖ or ―Clorox‖ for the right amount of money. 120
But at present time, that money does not seem to be forthcoming from
corporations; 121 perhaps they sense that these types of auctions are still
somewhat gauche or taboo, and would not result in the type of ―good
press‖ that most corporations seek for publicity purposes. On the other
hand, some might feel that any publicity is good publicity – which might
explain why a casino paid $10,000 to advertise its brand on a woman‘s
forehead. 122
B. Reduction of Geographic Barriers and Other Transaction Costs
In addition to anonymity, other features of the Internet seem to promote
the forces of cyber commodification.
These features include the
116

Gardner v. Denison, 105 N.E. 359 (Mass. 1914).
See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, F REAKONOMICS (2005) (chapter discussing earning
prospects for job seekers on the basis of their names); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily
and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha And Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,
(Nat‘l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working Paper
No.
9873,
2003),
available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.(collecting empirical data showing that having an African American
sounding name reduced the likelihood of receiving an interview when compared with similarly skilled and
educated applicant with White sounding name). See also Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario Barnes, By Any
Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283 (2005).
118
Gardner v. Denison, 105 N.E. 359 (Mass. 1914).
119
Id.
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Don Oldenburg, Ringing Up Baby; Companies Yawned at Child Naming Rights, But Was It an Idea
Ahead of Its Time?, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 13180849; Matthew Kauffman,
Newborn Naming Game: No Takers, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 10671257
121
Id.
122
Aaron Falk, Mom Sells Face Space for Tattoo Advertisement, DESERTNEWS. COM (Jun. 30,
2005),http://www.deseretnews.com/article/600145187/Mom-sells-face-space-for-tattoo-advertisement.html.
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decreasing relevance of geography and even national borders, and the lack
of clear jurisdictional legal boundaries. In short, the Internet lowers
transaction costs dramatically, and this propels the forces of
commodification. The two clearest illustrations of these forces are virtual
work and crowdfunding.
1. Virtual Work
As Internet and computer technology becomes increasingly ubiquitous
and less expensive, it has opened the door for new ways to buy and sell
not only objects, but also labor and time. In a previous article, I
described this phenomena, which I have termed ―virtual work,‖ but which
has also been alternately described as ―labor as a service,‖ ―peer
production,‖ or ―playbor.‖ 123 As noted by Randall Stross in The New
York Times, crowdsourcing technology has enabled the slicing of labor
into small increments, micro-tasks that break down a large job into its
lowest common denominator. 124 After the tasks are farmed out to
individual workers, they are then re-aggregated and the overall job is
completed. This is a process known as crowdsourcing. 125
In fact, millions of people worldwide entertain themselves or
supplement their incomes – or both – by working within virtual worlds
such as Second Life or casually ―clicking‖ to make a few dollars for
simple tasks on websites like Amazon.com‘s Mechanical Turk. 126
Because the money in virtual worlds is convertible to real world money,
virtual work is having an impact on real world economies. One
economist, Edward Castronova, has estimated that the economy of Sony‘s
game EverQuest and its world, Norrath, has a GNP, per capita,
equivalent to that of Bulgaria. 127 Another commentator, discussing
entrepreneurship in virtual worlds, had this to say:
[V]irtual worlds are home to serious business conducted
by hundreds of thousands of users. One study suggests
that virtual economies may reach the size of small
countries. The business varies from mining virtual gold
to real gambling and anything in-between. Virtual world
entrepreneurship is somewhat ironic. Much of the fun of
virtual worlds is unpredictability. . . . Yet,
entrepreneurship thrives in these worlds. Like any
123
See Trebor Scholz & Laura Liu, From Mobile Playgrounds to Sweatshop City, SITUATED
TECHNOLOGIES PAMPHLETS 7 (2010), http://www.situatedtechnologies.net/?q= node/105.
124
See Stross, supra note 18.
125
See, e.g. Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176, 178-79 (using term
―crowdsourcing‖ to describe work performed with the aid of contributions from diverse groups of users on the
internet); Deborah Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses, A Manifesto for User-Generated
Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 929 (2009) (―Computer technology in the hands of the masses has
made available software programs that can create music, documents, and art just as well as expensive studios
did in the past. This democratization of technology disrupts the monopoly on the creative means of production.
The world of amateur production also demonstrates that many are motivated by noncommercial reasons.‖).
126
EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF ONLINE GAMES 2-3
(2005).
127
Id. at 19-20.
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economy, where there is a demand for something of value
and someone willing to supply it, a market will form. 128
These pursuits are far more than mere ―games.‖ Recently, employment
agencies like Manpower and Randstad have begun recruiting, collecting
resumes and performing interviews with candidates on virtual worlds such
as Second Life. 129 In the wake of the economic downturn, websites such
as ELance, which serve to connect companies seeking short term help
with workers willing to take on short term assignments, have been doing
brisk business. 130 Throughout cyberspace, workers hold various jobs that,
in the words of leading commentators, make it possible to ―work in a
fantasy world to pay rent in reality.‖ 131
Recently, Professor Jonathan Zittrain noted that the advent of
virtual work simultaneously provides immense promise and peril for
workers in the new digital economy. 132 New technology allowing
collaboration can provide remarkable opportunities for workers and
employers alike. Traditional limitations on collaboration – of travel, of
meeting, of commuting – can be minimized or reduced. Employers can
use virtual spaces to make contacts and recruit talent, without spending
money on transportation. 133 Certainly, the possibility of matching workers
and jobs in cyberspace creates more opportunities and more efficient labor
128
Michael Risch, Virtual Rule of Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) (internal citations omitted). See
also Andrea Vanina Arias, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Swords and Armor: Regulating the Theft of Virtual
Goods, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301, 1302 (2008) (citing sources estimating that trade in virtual goods amounts from
approximately $200 million to $2 billion a year); Michael Capiro, Virtual Worlds with Real-World Losses, 56
F ED. LAW. 12 (Dec. 2009) (reporting estimate from investment banking firm Piper Jaffray that virtual sales of
goods amounted to $621 million in 2009 and were expected to grow to $2.3 billion by 2013); Theodore P.
Seto, When is a Game Only a Game?: The Taxation of Virtual Worlds, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027 (2009) (noting
that Ailin Graef, ―a Chinese-born citizen and resident of Germany, had parlayed an initial investment of $9.95
into virtual communities and other virtual holdings having a real-world fair market value, in the aggregate, of
more than one million dollars. In theory, Graef could have pulled her Second Life earnings out at any time; at
some point, she did in fact withdraw enough to found an 80-employee real-world company.‖).
129
Both Manpower and Randstad have advertisements posted on YouTube touting their recruiting services
in Second Life.
See, e.g.
Virtual Jobs at Ronstad, YOUTUBE. COM, (Apr. 12, 2007)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= k5xF43POYv8&feature= PlayList&p= 7B20448ABA3A94B8&playnext= 1
&playnext_from= PL&index= 43 (advertisement for Randstad); Manpower‘s Machinima on the World of
Virtual Work, Youtube.com (July 12, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= sNjxucDI8bo (advertisement
for Manpower);
130
See Ann Meyer, Fewer Strings a Draw for Employers, Virtual Contract Workers, Internet Tools help
Firms Grow, Afford to Add Talent, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2009, at 19 (noting that ―[y]ear-over-year project
hiring on Elance rose 40 percent in October, and more than 300,000 jobs have been posted on the Web site
during the past 12 months‖). Cf. Emma L. Carew, Tough Times Lead many into Virtual Work World, STARLEDGER, July 12, 2009 (noting that that the poor economy has pushed many employers into hiring virtual
office assistants).
131
F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).
132
Jonathan Zittrain, Work the New Digital Sweatshops, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 2009 (―It all sounds great,
and in many ways, it is. The Internet has created new markets for human labor potentially gleaned anywhere
in the world . . . [but] online contracting circumvents a range of labor laws and practices found in most
developed countries that govern worker protections, minimum wage, health and retirement benefits, child
labor, and so forth.‖); See also Robert D. Hof, The End of Work as You Know It, BUS. WK. 80, Aug. 20,
2007, at 80 available at 2007 WLNR 15875667 (―Will this be a new world of empowered individuals encased in
a bubble of time-saving technologies? Or will it be a brave new world of virtual sweatshops, where all but a techsavvy few are relegated to an always-on world in which keystrokes, contacts, and purchases are tracked and fed
into the faceless corporate maw?‖).
133
See, e.g. Gabrielle Monaghan, A Virtual Way to Find Real Talent, SUNDAY TIMES, March 16, 2008,
at 19 (describing KPMG and Accenture recruiting events on Second Life, and the fact that the Manpower
recruiting agency has also opened an island within Second Life); Joel Dresang, Manpower Opens Office in
Online Virtual Society, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 13, 2007 at D1.
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markets. 134 These changes can benefit workers, in part by increasing
flexibility and allowing workers more control over when and how they are
able to perform work. 135 In addition, employees have used virtual worlds
as part of their protected right to organize and to protest. 136 For example,
in September, 2007, over 2,000 employers protested IBM Italy‘s pay
package by appearing at IBM‘s headquarters in Second Life. 137
Virtual work, however, presents many of the same enduring
problems that workers‘ rights advocates have struggled with over the
years. Gold farming operations and other types of virtual work have been
criticized by commentators as creating new ―virtual sweatshops.‖ 138 For
years corporations have engaged in races to the bottom, not only in
selecting the jurisdiction of incorporation that will govern their internal
corporate affairs, 139 but also to find the jurisdictions with the cheapest
labor and the least regulation of employment relationships. 140 The concern
about virtual work is that it will lead to further acceleration of the race to
the bottom and ultimately the further erosion of worker‘s rights and
benefits. 141
In a popular press article, Professor Jonathan Zittrain set out a useful
typology of crowdsourcing based on the level of knowledge required in
order to complete a given work task. 142 In the level requiring the most
skill, companies post difficult scientific problems and promise a reward
for the answer. For example, on the Innocentive website, 143 highly skilled
scientists try to solve complicated problems in order to reap financial
prizes. In the middle skill level, some websites rate and grade workers at
various tasks to ensure quality control for routine backroom operations,
such as that performed by customer service representatives. For example,
134
See Kermit Pattison, How to Enlist a Global Work Force of Freelancers, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009
(noting ways in which working with freelancers can increase productivity); Cf. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN
SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND L EGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003).
135
Carol Sladek & Ellie Hollander, Where is Everyone? The Rise of Workplace Flexibility, BENEFITS Q.,
April 1, 2009, at 17 (noting that flexibility is ―being able to be at Little League at 3:30 in the afternoon, with
the ability to catch up on work after dinner with the family. Flexibility is a way for the employer to
acknowledge and enable the whole person.‖).
136
29 U.S.C. §151-169 (2000).
137
On Strike, Virtually, THE ECONOMIST, March 15, 2008, at 87, available at 2008 WLNR 5068500.
138
See David Barboza, Ogre to Slay? Outsource it to Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005 at A1; Cf.
Wendy Duong, Ghetto’ing Third World Workers with Hi-Tech: Industrial Application of Artificial Intelligence
and its Effect on Foreign Direct Investment in the Third World – Exploring Regulatory Solutions Through an
Emblematic Case for the New Economy, 21 TEMPLE INT‘L & COMP. L. J. 63 (2008).
139
See, e.g. Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State Competition For
Corporate Charters In The Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681 (2003) (describing the
decision process of choosing a jurisdiction of incorporation).
140
See, e.g. Raul Delgado Wise & James M. Cyper, NAFTA, Labor, and the National State: The
Strategic Role of Mexican Labor under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on Current Economic Integration, 610
ANNALS 120 (2007) (discussing the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on outsourcing);
Keith Woffinden, Surfing the Next Wave of Outsourcing: The Ethics of Sending Domestic Legal Work to
Foreign Countries Under New York City Opinion 2006-3, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 483 (2007) (discussing the
legal and ethical implications of outsourcing legal work); Christina Laun, The Central American Free Trade
Agreement and the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing, 17 IND. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 431 (2007) (considering
impact of Central American Free Trade Agreement on U.S. manufacturing industries); Archie A. Alexander
III, American Diagnostic Radiology Moves Offshore: Where Is The “Internet Wave” Taking This Field?, 20 J.
L. & HEALTH 199 (2006/2007) (analyzing outsourcing of medical services).
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Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To The Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers In A Global Market, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93 (1999) (describing race to the bottom phenomenon within global labor
markets).
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Jonathan Zittrain, Work the New Digital Sweatshops, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 2009.
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INNOCENTIVE, http://www.innocentive.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
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on LiveOps, 144 telephone calls are routed to individual customer service
workers on their cellphones. Finally, at the lowest end, there is work that
encompasses tasks that require only minimal awareness, such as the entry
of a few characters or the clicking of a mouse in a second or two.
Regardless of the level of skill involved, crowdsourcing takes the products
of many workers to create something greater than the sum of its parts. 145
Crowdsourcing and other types of distributed work are likely to
increase in frequency in the years to come. While once Amazon‘s
Mechanical Turk was synonymous with crowdsourcing, there are now
many more websites that promise to help users harness the power of the
crowd. The tasks that can be assigned through crowdsourcing are
virtually limitless. 146 Other websites work subtly, sometimes without the
knowledge of the user. For example, to prevent websites and blogs from
being swamped with ―spam‖ from automated comment generators, many
sites require users to enter a word. The reCAPTCHA software uses this
anti-spam device to digitize books and newspapers by aggregating them
one word at a time. 147 In another twist, some websites are using fun
games to entice users to work for them. For example, one website
presents players with puzzles, the answers to which help scientists to
determine how proteins fold. 148 Crowdsourcing has been used to check
surveillance cameras between the United States - Mexico border to look
for aliens, and to use computers to help SETI in their search for different
types of aliens. 149
Other forms of virtual work blur the line between work and
leisure. A number of China‘s new ―factories‖ feature computer workers,
typing and clicking away, playing video games, collecting coins and
swords, and fighting monsters. 150 Known as ―gold farmers,‖ these
workers are paid to harvest virtual treasures for online gamers in the
developed world. These First World gamers want to advance quickly
within the game and, tired of the repetitive tasks necessary to build a highlevel character, would prefer to pay others to do the work. 151 As a result,
gold farming operations have appeared in many Third World countries,
144

LIVEOPS, http://www.liveops.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176, 178-79 (using term
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STAR, Feb. 28, 2008, at 4.
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noticing can help to crack problems that have defeated the most powerful computers, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 8,
2008, at 36.
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See Benkler, supra note 33, at 81-83.
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David Barboza, Ogre to Slay? Outsource it to Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005 at A1.
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According to another recent article on the Chinese gold farmers, there are now three models for
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and then, through intermediaries, sell the virtual property in exchange for cash. In the second model, called
―leveling,‖ a wealthy player will pay the gold farmers to play his character twenty-four hours a day, allowing
the character to become vastly powerful in a short period. Finally, the third model involves assembling a team
of Chinese players, who guide the first-world player to the highest levels, and then let the first world player
receive the most valuable objects (which cannot be sold). See Julian Dibbell, The Life of a Chinese Gold
Farmer, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
145

22

Miriam A. Cherry

[1-Oct-12

where labor costs are low. 152 For example, a company named Blacksnow
opened operations in Tijuana, Mexico, paying Mexican nationals dollars a
day to kill dragons and obtain objects in Mythic Entertainment‘s online
Camelot game. 153 Acting as an intermediary, Blacksnow later resold these
virtual objects on eBay154 and other online exchange sites to high bidders
in First World countries, thereby taking advantage of lower labor costs in
developing nations. 155 Another model that uses these relative differences
in wages is to have Third World computer workers ―play‖ the characters
of First World gamers while they sleep. 156 Workers in Third World
countries are playing these online games not as entertainment, but as a
means of making a living. 157 Their alternatives may include far more
dangerous work in a dirty, crowded, and unsafe factory or barely scraping
by as a subsistence farmer. 158
All of this is to say that, because of the way crowdsourcing
technology has developed, and the existing vacuum in meaningful
regulation, virtual work straddles the line between commodified and noncommodified activity. Virtual work, rather like many other aspects of
emerging technologies on the internet, is a diverse mix of free
collaboration coexisting with monetized and commodified settings. 159 As
Professor Lior Strahilevitz has described, one of the models for clickwork
depends on collaboration, and this collaboration is not always successful if
the market economics are subtracted from the equation. 160 It may be that
virtual worlds may be big enough for several economies (or noneconomies, as the case may be) to coexist with each other. Here is a
controversial question:
could non-commodification lead to the
exploitation of virtual workers? I will return to this question in the last
152

Id.
When Mythic Entertainment attempted to shut down Blacksnow‘s trading site, Blacksnow brought suit
in the Central District of California, but the suit was settled before trial. Complaint, Blacksnow Interactive v.
Mythic Entm‘t Inc., No. 02-00112 (C.D. Cal. Filed Feb. 5, 2002). See also Richard Raysman & Peter Brown,
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Blizzard Entm‘t., Inc., No. 06-2555 (D. Ariz. 2006 filed on Oct. 25, 2006).
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158
According to 2003 data from an ILO survey, average employees in different countries work varying
numbers of hours. In the United States, the average employee worked slightly more than 40 hours per week.
Americans worked more than the French, whose workers averaged 35.5 hours, and worked more than most of
the average workers in countries in industrialized Europe. However, workers in the developing world worked
much harder, with more hours worked in Argentina, China, and Mexico. The hardest working country was
Egypt, where employees worked on average fifty-seven hours per week. See SANGHEON LEE, ET. AL.,
WORKING TIME AROUND THE WORLD: TRENDS IN WORKING HOURS, LAWS AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2003).
159
For example, while the internet is encouraging a culture of sharing, open source software, and
distributed, collaborative work, see Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm,
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section of the Article.
2.

Crowdfunding

Crowdfunding is an excellent illustration of the forces of cyber
commodification. While traditionally, there have been numerous barriers
to raising investment capital, such as the limited number of individuals
with large amounts of money to invest or an innovator' s limited ability to
find and contact those individuals, these barriers can be overcome through
new crowdfunding models.
Crowdfunding appeals to those with small amounts of money to
invest. Crowdfunding websites allow entrepreneurs to communicate
information about their businesses and endeavors to a larger audience.
According to a recent book, crowdfunding covers a multitude of activities:
Crowfunding describes the collective cooperation, attention
and trust by people who network and pool their money and
other resources together, usually via the Internet, to support
efforts initiated by other people or organizations . . . The
crowdfunding space is quite diverse, comprised of many
niches, and shares a lot of social networking‘s energy.
Whether to solicit donations and create a fan base for an
around-the-world sailing adventure, to pre-sell copies of a
book, or to finance a startup in return for equity, some
form of crowdfunding is available. 161
Pooling their money allows individuals with only small amounts to invest
the ability to join in the market, often helping artists and musicians
produce their work and or to help charitable organizations get off the
ground. 162
Until very recently, there was no exemption from the securities laws
for crowdfunding, since a general solicitation on a website would have
run afoul of the 1933 Securities and Exchange Act rules against
unregistered public offerings. 163
As a result, in recent years
crowdfunding websites turned to alternate and creative investment forms.
For example, some crowdfunding websites followed the model of the
website Kiva, 164 which promotes microfinance, and which promises no
return or interest on the amount, just a return of the capital. In these
ways people can put up small amounts of money for a good cause, rather
like a donation to a social entrepreneurship model like the Grameen Bank.
161

KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION 1-2 (2010).
Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws – Why
any Specially Tailored Exemption Should be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure 1 (Feb. 20, 2012
(forthcoming available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1954040).
163
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(2011),
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Securities
Laws,
COLUM.
BUS.
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J.
(forthcoming),
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Other websites, like Kickstarter 165 and IndieGoGo, 166 provided those who
put up money a return in the form of discounted products or free
merchandise, but not the traditional monetary dividend traditionally
associated with stock. 167
In April, 2012, the JOBS Act was signed into law, creating a small
exemption for crowdfunding.
The new law allows for a limited
exemption for crowdfunding of up to $1 million per year, with certain
limits on amounts per each investor including to annual income or net
worth, with particular requirements that crowdsourcing websites and
companies on using those websites must meet. 168 Needless to say, the
regulatory atmosphere for crowdfunding has now changed dramatically.
Professor Steven Bradford, however, notes that the costs of complying
with the crowdfunding exemption may be high enough that only high
profile or well-funded companies may be able to use it; of course that
somewhat defeats the purpose of assisting start-up companies with their
financing. 169 While the regulatory environment for crowdfunding has
improved, we will need to see whether barriers to entry will inhibit its
growth.
III.

The Process of Cyber Commodification

Historically, it is not uncommon for innovation to start with gifted
amateurs inventing or acting out of passion, then for the advance to be
taken over by business people and investors who integrate the innovation
into the existing economy and develop it for profit. One could think about
the development of cellphones and their relationship to the earlier ham
radio operators on the autopatch. Thinking back to the Huffington Post
example, what began as a gathering akin to a liberal town hall meeting
eventually became something closer to a for-profit new-media business.
In this section, the business model of craigslist, the monetization of
Facebook, and the growth of social entrepreneurship are examined.
A. Free or Not to Be?: The Clash between eBay and Craigslist
In 2004, online auction giant eBay170 sought to acquire craigslist, 171 the
largest online site for classified advertisements in North America. While
two of craigslists‘ founders, Craig Newmark and John Buckmaster, were
not interested in selling the company, they were amenable to having eBay
buy out the shares of the remaining (third) shareholder, who was actively
165
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shopping his shares. 172 Understanding that they would only acquire a
minority holding of 28.4%, eBay sought to protect its interests through
cumulative voting rights. 173 Mathematically, cumulative voting would
give eBay one seat on the three-person craigslist board with Newmark and
Buckmaster as the two other directors. 174 From their perspective,
Newmark and Buckmaster were concerned that eBay would take what
they learned as shareholders and use that information to compete against
craigslist. 175 As such, they built in provisions to remove certain rights
from eBay‘s equity shares if eBay started a competing business. 176
From the beginning, the relationship between eBay and craigslist was
particularly fraught.
In his 2010 opinion, Chancellor Chandler
categorized the two companies as ―oil and water.‖ 177 Expounding upon
this theme, Chancellor Chandler explained:
Even though both companies enjoy household-name
status, craigslist and eBay are, to put it mildly, different
animals. Indeed, the two companies are a study in
contrasts, with different business strategies, different
cultures, and different perspectives on what it means to
run a successful business . . . Though a for-profit
concern, craigslist largely operates its business as a
community service. Nearly all classified advertisements
are placed on craigslist free of charge. Moreover,
craigslist does not sell advertising space on its website to
third parties. . . For most of its history craigslist has not
focused on monetizing its site. The relatively small
amount of monetization craigslist has pursued (for select
job postings and apartment listings) does not approach
what many craigslist competitors would consider an
optimal or even minimally acceptable level. . . eBay is a
for-profit concern that operates its business with an eye to
maximizing revenues, profits, and market share . . . It has
a large management team and a formal management
structure. It employs over 16,000 people at multiple
locations around the world… It might be said that ―eBay‖
is a moniker for monetization and that ―craigslist‖ is
anything but. 178
The clash of values played itself out in the years after eBay‘s investment
and eventually led to the dispute that landed the parties in the Delaware
courts. During this time, eBay advised craigslist on ways to monetize the
website, while Craig Newmark and John Buckmaster rebuffed eBay‘s
172
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suggestions. 179 Meanwhile, eBay decided to launch its own competing
platform for online classifieds, Kijiji.com. 180 Launching the competing
website triggered serious consequences for eBay‘s investment, leading its
shares to lose some of their associated rights, per the original terms of the
investment contract. 181 Chancellor Chandler ruled that while the new
staggered board structure that craigslist put in place was contemplated by
the shareholder‘s agreement and was permissible, the poison pill and right
of first refusal provisions were impermissible. 182
In discussing the implementation of the poison pill, and the threat
to its corporate culture that craigslist perceived, the Delaware Chancery
Court engaged in a lengthy discussion about profit maximization. As the
Court noted in discussing the craigslist business model:
Jim and Craig did prove that they personally believe
craigslist should not be about the business of stockholder
wealth maximization, now or in the future . . . The
corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is
not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends,
at least not when there are other stockholders interested in
realizing a return on their investment. Jim and Craig
opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for profit Delaware
corporation and voluntarily accepted millions of dollars
from eBay as part of a transaction whereby eBay became
a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit corporate form
the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties
and standards that accompany that form. Those standards
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for
the benefit of its stockholders. The ―Inc.‖ after the
company name has to mean at least that. 183
Here, the court privileged eBay‘s more traditional business model and the
concept of shareholder primacy above craigslist‘s ―public service‖
business model. 184 But in the new Internet economy, the business model
craiglist uses is not as odd as Chancellor Chandler‘s opinion might lead us
to believe. Many of us would pay a few cents to query directions from an
online GPS mapping program each time we used it. Others would pay to
get information that is now freely available on wikipedia or other
websites. Instead, however, these services choose not to monetize,
instead building a free, open access service.
179
Id., at 15; Ina Steiner, eBay Founder Pierre Omidyar Testifies in eBay v. Craigslist Trial,
ECOMMERCEBYTES. COM (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/cab/abn/y09/m12/i08/s01.
180
eBay, 16 A.3d, at 17.
181
eBay, 16 A.3d, at 20.
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eBay, 14 A.3d at 33, 48.
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eBay, 16 A.3d, at 34.
184
For commentary on the dueling business models involved in the case, see Joshnua Fershee,
Philanthropy as a Business Model: Comparing Ford to Craigslist, BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business law/2010/09/philanthropy-as-a-business-model-comparing-ford-tocraigslist.htlml (last visited Jan. 18, 2012); Dealbook, Craigslist Meets the Capitalists, NYTIMES. COM (May 2,
2008); Steven M. Davidoff, What’s Next for eBay, Craigslist and the Poison Pill, NYTIMES. COM (Sept. 13,
2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/whats-next-for-ebay-craigslist-and-poison-pills/.

1-Oct-12]

Cyber Commodification

27

Similarly, rather than try to achieve maximum returns by wringing
every advertising dollar from its site, craigslist opted to build its user base
with a free and uncomplicated interface. By charging landlords a small
fee to list properties in New York City, and also charging employers for
listing want-ads, craigslist keeps itself afloat while attaining modest
returns. If the format of the website were to change too drastically,
including too much monetization, craigslist might encounter resisistance
from users. In other words, once a non-commodified website begins to
include too many monetized elements, it might risk losing its user base.
Too much monetization too quickly could prove to be the end of many a
once-convenient website. And without the power of the crowd behind it,
a business that relies on user input and content may find itself out of
business entirely.
Despite all of these possible justifications for craigslist to operate
as it did, the Delware Chancery Court insisted upon analyzing the
problem through the narrow lens of shareholder profit maximization. As
such the ―eBay model‖ was triumphant. In light of this holding, it might
be best for us to acknowledge that the temptation to monetize something
free may always be there, not just because of moral hazard, but also
because corporate law might suggest such a result as the default rule. 185
Whether this default is normatively desirable may be another question. 186
The monetization of friendship also is a part of the process of cyber
commodification, and I turn to that discussion in the next subpart.
B. Social NetWORKing
Another example of the process of commodification can be seen in the
monetization of friendship. Currently valued at an estimated $100
billion, 187 Facebook can be both a valuable personal and business
networking application. 188 Indeed, in both the for-profit and non-profit
sectors, social networking is hailed as a major trend. 189 Traditionally,
friendship is seen as a gift freely given, separate and apart from money. 190
With the advent of social networking, however, the monetization of
friendship is increasingly possible and companies are beginning to take
advantage of this new business model. However, the commodification of
friendship may have some unintended consequences.
As Stephanie Rosenbloom reports in the New York Times, ―imagine a
185
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See also Stephanie
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world in which we are assigned a number that indicates how influential we
are.‖ 191 New businesses such as Klout, 192 PeerIndex, 193 and Twitter
Grader 194 datamine social media activities and assign those who use them
so-called influence scores. 195 These scores are based on online social
networking activity, and increase depending on the number of followers
and friends that a user has been able to attract. 196 And as a user
recommends a business to the user‘s social network friends and they
follow suit, the user‘s influence score rises. Currently, those with high
scores get preferential treatment from retailers. According to the story,
more than 2,500 marketers are now using Klout‘s data, including
companies as diverse as Audi and the Las Vegas Palms. 197
In a blog post analyzing the New York Times article, Professor
Danielle Citron writes:
What‘s troubling is the trend‘s implications for society
and culture. It seems old school to say that people blog,
make friends, and engage in online chats to play,
experiment, and create culture. Now, they may feel
pressured to do all of these things as a matter of economic
necessity. We may forgo experimentation for product
endorsements, and idle chatter for better job prospects.
This makes our children‘s choice to engage with social
media seem like less of choice than a carefully cultivated
necessity. 198
As Professor Citron‘s comment contemplates, and as the previous section
describing crowdsourcing has noted, the divide between ―virtual work‖
and ―virtual leisure‖ is a difficult one. So too is the gap between what is
fun and pleasurable on Facebook and what provides a monetary benefit.
Using Facebook is free, but every user helps expand the monetization as
they represent an addition to the audience for potential advertising.
Facebook merely provides the platform. On its own, without someone‘s
friends on it as members as well, Facebook would not provide a very
satisfying experience. Rather, it is the user-generated content, which
Facebook then owns, that provides the true value of the website.
C. From Networking to Social Entrepreneurship
The idea that social ties are valuable and subject to monetization
certainly is one example of cyber commodification. But there are other,
191
Stephanie Rosenblum, Got Twitter? You’ve Been Scored, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, available at
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192
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more philanthropic ways of combining business, social networking, and
technology, specifically in the form of a new model called social
entrepreneurship.
As one author explains, ―to qualify as social
entrepreneurship, the activity must not only be entrepreneurial and social
in nature, but also groundbreaking in scale and effect. ‖ 199 Professor Celia
Taylor notes that for a business model to qualify as social
entrepreneurship, an ―entity must engage in ordinary, viable business
enterprise. . . however, a social business must be created and run for the
express purpose of pursuing specific, articulated social goals, rather than
maximizing profits.‖ 200 The concept is somewhat related to corporate
social responsibility (CSR), for social entrepreneurs, in common with
those who believe in CSR, aim to provide two interrelated goals, financial
profit and social progress. 201 As one author explains, however, they are
different in the sense that social entrepreneurship is of necessity built into
the business, rather than CSR, which may in some instances be ―bolted
on.‖ 202 Without the social goal, the socially entrepreneurial business
would not exist. 203
As social entrepreneurship is a fairly new concept, there are not
yet many concrete examples, and defining a social business can result in
some measure of interpretation and debate. One current business model
that seems to exemplify social entrepreneurship is microfinance. Grameen
Bank founder Muhammad Yunus conceived of his plan for microfinance
based on his own observations of Bangladeshi poverty and the provision
of small personal loans from his own pocket. 204 The idea was to assist
some of the poorest people in the world by providing seed money for
small businesses that would also enrich their communities by providing
much-needed services. In such a way, a small amount of money could
yield large social dividends. Today, the Gremeen Bank has grown with
international philanthropic support, but ―Grameencredit‖ maintains as its
most distinctive feature that the loans are based on trust, not collateral. 205
Other programs may help teach those living in poverty skills such as
installing solar panels, which can help that person financially, and also
increase the standard of living in impoverished communities.
Individuals will likely donate either their money or time to socially
199
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entrepreneurial ventures from purely philanthropic motivations, and while
these may be the motivations for corporate donations as well, a business
might have other goals in engaging in social entrepreneurship. Investing
and participating in social businesses can uncover new markets for the sale
of goods and services. As one commentator notes, ―social ventures can
provide important access to markets, which companies can then capitalize
on with their profit-maximizing operations.‖ 206 Corporations can also
benefit from engaging in social business as a research opportunity to learn
about the people, the culture, and the resources in the particular
geographic area where a social enterprise is implemented. 207
In other words, social entrepreneurship is a composite of various
business models, with a lesser degree of commodification. Other such
―hybrid‖ business models are currently being developed, including
businesses that focus on sustainability and those that have registered as B
Corporations. 208
The urge for profit helps individuals while also
benefiting communities and leading to an increase in knowledge and
human capital. While many of the problems and disputes surrounding
commodification involve an incongruous clash of expectations around
profit, social entrepreneurship may provide a template for navigating
mixed or partially commodified business models.
Other ways of
reconciling cyber commodification, however, have not been so successful.
And so from the topic of the process of cyber commodification, we turn to
the area of contests and disputes.
IV.

Contests and Disputes

As we saw in the Introduction, differing expectations over the nature
of the Huffington Post – whether the blog was intended as an online
forum for the liberal community or a for-profit entity – created a clash of
values and ultimately led to a lawsuit. Whether it is the expectations of
virtual workers, the question of whether predictions about the future can
be monetized, or how access to legal research materials should be
apportioned, the same questions of commodification and conflicting
expectations run throughout many of the examples provided. We have
seen that commodification is not necessarily bad – in virtual work, in fact,
it may be a necessity to ensure that workers receive a living wage.
However, disputes tend to occur when one group comes to a contractual
relationship believing that they are participating in a non-commodified
website, when really the creators of the website have monetization of the
206
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website in mind. In this section, I wish to examine some of the instances
where there have been contests and disputes over cyber commodification.
Here I begin with an analysis of the commodification of knowledge in
prediction markets, then shift to the market for legal research, and end
with an analysis of ―free‖ Wi-Fi.
A. Prediction Markets
Prediction markets are a new economic tool that allow thousands
of individuals on the Internet to express their opinions within a market
setting. 209 By letting people put ―their money where their mouth is,‖
prediction markets encourage thousands of people to join together in
cyberspace to predict future events. In other writing I have described how
prediction markets operate, as well the opportunities and challenges posed
by them in more depth. 210
The short version is that prediction markets organize and aggregate
individual knowledge into a collective result. 211 Each individual who is a
trader in the information market acts to maximize his or her own reward.
At the same time, the organizers of the market collectivize the results and
harvest the valuable information that market participants have generated.
The theory behind information markets is loosely related to the semistrong version of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which holds
that, in a properly functioning capital market, the prices of securities will
reflect all relevant publicly available information. 212 To put it another
way, most markets contain a ―price discovery‖ function, aggregating
information and predictions into the current price of that security. 213 In
traditional capital markets, however, the information-seeking aspects are,
to a certain degree, by-products of trading and raising capital. In
contrast, this information-seeking is the sole reason for the information
market‘s existence.
One of the most well-known prediction markets is the Iowa Electronic
Markets (―IEM‖). 214 The IEM, started in 1988 by academics at the
University of Iowa Business School, has been operating since that time to
predict the outcomes of various elections. 215 Any individual participant is
209
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limited to a $500 investment, so although the financial stake of any one
person in the outcome is modest, each still has a financial incentive for
making a correct prediction. 216 Other similar political prediction markets
have appeared to predict the outcome of elections in Austria, 217 Germany,
218
and Canada. 219 In previous work I detail the origins of various
prediction markets and classify the areas in which they are operating. 220
At the same time that prediction markets started to become more
common, the legal regime surrounding ―real‖ money markets became
more chilly. In 2006, an online gambling ban enacted in the United States
had a devastating effect on the growth of publicly available prediction
markets. 221 Although a prediction markets are not the same as, say,
betting in a horse race, that is, the prediction market seeks information
above and beyond allocation between players, the law was written so
broadly that prediction markets were swept into its coverage. Despite
some argument on the part of the author that prediction markets involved
speech and expressive conduct, the gambling ban has meant that the
majority of publicly available prediction markets have either been forced
into using play money or have taken their operations overseas. 222
Ultimately, the regulatory ban on using money in prediction
markets effectively frustrated the development of an important
information-gathering technology. The larger point, which I will return to
in Section VI, is that commodification in and of itself is not necessarily
―bad‖ when it comes to a developing technology.
In fact,
commodification can be quite beneficial at times, especially when it
functions to incentivize participants to reveal information, predictions, and
knowledge that could benefit others. While some commodification
situations cry out for more regulation, perhaps because of the desperation
of those engaged in them, or some idea of exploitation, those elements
could not be further from the type of useful predictive activity present in
an information market. As such, regulation of commodification should be
fully analyzed before being imposed – especially when the technology
here was not even truly the subject of the regulation. With that lesson, I
turn to see how access to legal and government materials has been
commodified, somewhat in defiance of the notion that these materials
should be publicly available to all citizens. Recent developments are
somewhat encouraging that access to information may be more
216
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forthcoming – but this area is also not without its dispute.
B. The Monetization of Legal Research and an Online Clearinghouse for
Legal Academia
In a common-law, precedent-based system such as the one we have in
the United States, the strength of a legal argument rests, in large part, on
how other courts have resolved the same or similar issues. Such a system
leads to consistency of results, and with consistency comes stability. In
other words, the system depends on making arguments from precedent.
Therefore, access to justice largely rests on having access to earlier
decided cases. Local governments, states, and the federal government,
however, have been slow to make materials accessible, even though the
justice system is supported by taxpayers. While some law libraries
feature open access to the public, others are privately run. But access to a
law library does not necessarily guarantee up to date legal research.
Among print resources, it is difficult and time-consuming to check to see
if a particular case has been overruled or otherwise called into question.
Without any ability to use computerized searching, and given the sheer
volume of what one person might need to sift through, the quest for cases
in print format can be difficult and time-consuming. 223
As far as online resources, for years this gap in access has been filled
by for-profit companies.
Various CDs with legal information are
available for purchase from a variety of vendors. For the most part,
however, the need for computerized research has been filled by two forprofit companies, Westlaw224 and Lexis. 225 For years, these two providers
have featured searchable databases in which users could enter Boolean
searches to find applicable caselaw, statutes, law review articles, and
newspaper articles. Further, users of both these databases could perform
an automated check to see what other cases had cited any case they were
examining, and to see, ultimately, if any particular case was overruled or
otherwise had its authority called into question. These commercialized
databases were problematic for access, however, in that they have
historically charged a substantial sum for their services. 226 As more and
more other services migrated online, both Lexis and Westlaw moved to a
world wide web model, which meant that its users could access the
service whether researching from work, from the library, at home, or
elsewhere. Still, the service remained expensive and there were few
competitors to challenge the market domination of Westlaw and Lexis.
Paradoxically, access to materials written by judges and legislators – all of
which was meant to be open to the public – was made proprietary and
223
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commercialized simply because Westlaw and Lexis allowed users to
search effectively and conveniently.
The same access problem is also present with academic legal research.
In the field of legal studies, law review articles and other legal academic
writing has historically been difficult for the public to access freely. 227
Most law schools publish a law review, and in some instances schools also
publish secondary journals specializing in a particular type of legal
scholarship. Historically, law reviews were only available to those that
had a subscription, with the result that law libraries were one of the few
places these materials were available. As technology developed, Westlaw
and Lexis placed law review articles online. While legal academics and
law students worked for free to write and edit these articles, these online
databases charged their subscribers for access to these works. Not only
are these databases expensive, but between the time the author submitted
their work to the law review, and then the time when the article actually
would be available on the electronic database, often a year or more would
pass.
More recently, many law reviews began making published articles
available for free on their websites. While this was a significant step
toward more accessibility, there is no centralized aggregating or indexing
service that allows for search across different law review websites.
Likewise, law journals only post the final versions of articles, meaning
that there continues to be a significant time lag between when an article is
given to the law review editors and when it becomes available to the
public.
Enter the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), which touted its
website228 as a free platform for housing academic research in the social
sciences. The SSRN website is a platform that allows registered users to
post drafts of their articles to the Internet. 229 Although SSRN does not
allow for content searching in the same way as commercial database like
Westlaw or Lexis, it has the advantage of making an author‘s work almost
immediately available. In addition, it is a free service, which is a huge
assistance to those who are searching for legal knowledge but do not have
access to expensive databases. This was such an advantage that many
thought of SSRN as cutting edge – a new and revolutionary ―open access‖
way of thinking about legal and social science scholarship. Legal
academics were able to point others to their work quickly and for free,
expanding their readership and the audience for their ideas. 230
Quickly, however, concerns among academics began to emerge. Even
though SSRN had acted in many ways like an open access non-profit and
was run by prominent academics, actually the website is owned by a forprofit corporation. 231 Many academics found out about the for-profit
227
See Dan Hunter, Walled Gardens, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607, 613 (2005) (describing difficulty
accessing materials and calling on law review publishing to become more open access).
228
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (SSRN) HOME PAGE, http://www.ssrn.com (last visited Mar.
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229
Hunter, supra note 233, at 626.
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nature of SSRN in surprising ways. First, there was a false alarm that
SSRN was going to charge for access to papers. However, it was then
learned that SSRN would not charge for internet viewing, but would be
selling bound hard copies of papers to those who wanted such a
printout. 232 Later, users of the website began to see advertisements on the
sides of the screen that were tied to the topics of the papers that were
being searched. Further, any article that was posted on SSRN received an
SSRN watermark down the middle of the page as a form of advertising. 233
Throughout all of these efforts, SSRN has been testing ways to
commercialize its website, but the professors who were posting papers did
not necessarily realize that this work that they were posting was in the
process of being commercialized by others.
As Professor James Grimmelmann noted, in describing the reasons
that he was choosing to post his research papers elsewhere:
[i]f you make your money by selling subscriptions, then it
makes institutional sense to place your own advertising on
the goods. Never mind what these decisions do to open
access to scholarship. That‘s no longer the point. SSRN
is a for-profit corporation. It‘s not yet (I think) a moneymaking corporation, but its goal is to make money for its
owners. It has chosen to do so by providing useful openaccess services to scholars, but when push comes to
shove, the bottom line comes before the open access part.
We don‘t need to blame SSRN or find fault with it. It‘s
just doing what comes naturally—making the decision that
[it has] supplied sufficient open access to fit into a market
niche and declaring that good enough. 234
In other words, whether a website promotes an open access ethic or is a
commercialized venture is an important norm. When operators of
platforms and users are not in agreement about what those norms should
be, disputes arise. While at first SSRN seemed to promise a revolution in
open access that might make a very real difference in the status quo of
legal research, the question is whether it will dedicate itself to that mission
in the future. Will the owners of SSRN succumb to moral hazard? SSRN
may be poised for the same type of dispute between owners and users that
rocked the Huffington Post.
C. “Free” Wi-Fi
to open access scholarship given the for-profit nature of their business).
232
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Another area of contest and dispute about monetization concerns the
provision of Wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi). Wi-Fi is an almost ubiquitous
recent phenomenon, allowing Internet access in public settings, such as
coffee shops, restaurants, hotels, or airports. At the end of the 1990s,
small, independent, local businesses tended to provide free Internet
service and chains and large businesses tended to charge customers for
access. However, within the last year or so, the market has undergone a
paradigm shift, with large chains now offering free Wi-Fi. Meanwhile,
small businesses, perhaps because of the challenging economic
environment during the recession, have started charging for their Wi-Fi
services.
Wi-Fi, which had existed on some university campuses, started to
see more widespread adoption around the turn of the century.235 Among
one of the first commercial users of this new technology was Starbucks
Coffee, which announced at the beginning of 2001 that they would begin
rolling out Wi-Fi access across the United States in a partnership with
MobileStar.236 The results were incredible: by the end of the year, over five
hundred Starbucks had installed Wi-Fi and had high transmission speeds.237
Access to Starbucks‘ network did not come cheaply, however. Users could
choose between $15.95 a month for unlimited access, or use a pay-as-yougo plan which cost ―about $3 for 15 minutes.‖238 However, only ten months
after the announced partnership with Starbucks, MobileStar went out of
business, and at least one analyst speculated that the high cost of its pricing
structure was to blame.239 Quickly, other Wi-Fi providers moved into the
market, and some began offering free access—perhaps most noticeably a
non-profit which provided free Wi-Fi to areas in New York City.240
By 2003, news accounts noted that Wi-Fi access in commercial
space had increased to include the now-defunct Borders Books and
McDonalds, smaller retailers and some locations in Europe.241 Pricing
structure was in a state of flux, likely due to the new players entering the
market. While retailers like Starbucks still charged access fees, McDonalds
and retailers like it provided an hour of free access with the purchase of
certain meals.242 Other providers also sought to enter the market and
provide Wi-Fi access to consumers for free, hoping to monetize access to
these users by selling advertisements.243 At least some of these providers
saw themselves in direct competition with the older market participants, like
235
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Starbucks.244 The approach seemed to be working, and by mid 2003, both
the technology and finance sectors had doubts about the ability to capitalize
Wi-Fi hotspots, some cautioning that the industry would do well to
remember the pitfalls of the then recent dot-com crash.245
It seemed the tipping point for free Wi-Fi access arrived in 2004.
News media continued to publish stories highlighting the increasing
proliferation of Wi-Fi networks, while simultaneously casting doubts that
models requiring payment for access were sustainable.246 The media
portrayed the payment model as facing stiff competition from those
providing free Wi-Fi, both intentionally247 and accidently.248
Small
businesseses proclaimed they would use free Wi-Fi access as a loss-leader
to draw in business—sometimes evoking Starbucks directly in
comparison.249 However, by 2005 a report by JiWire, Inc seemed to
dampen those projections, noting that of the 34,544 Wi-Fi hotspots listed,
only 10% were free, while Starbucks maintained 5,770 hotspots, and
McDonalds nearly 12,000.250
The competition between price structures has not yet subsided—
despite the frequent shifting in the market, both in terms of who the
providers are and what share of the market they captured. In 2008, one of
the largest providers of Wi-Fi access, AT&T, moved to allow free unlimited
access at any of its hotspots—provided the customer purchased home high
speed Internet first.251 Shortly thereafter, AT&T partnered with Starbucks
to service their Wi-Fi, and offered two free hours of access, then a first for
Starbucks.252 However, this move did not prevent small local coffee shops,
large chains like Panera, and even fast food restaurants like Schlotzky‘s
Deli from providing free Wi-Fi access as an attempt to drive visitors from
Starbucks.253 Interestingly, soon after partnering with AT&T, Starbucks
announced they would attempt to fuse both price structures by granting
limited free access to customers who used a loyalty card at least once per
month.254 USA Today noted that Starbucks rolled the program out during
―the worst slump in its history‖ and likely did so in an attempt to draw
244
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customers and profits.255
Anecdotal evidence suggests that independent coffee shop owners,
at least those in New York City, are starting to reverse course and remove
free Wi-Fi due to a tightening economy and increased costs.256 Further
evidence suggests smaller owners do not see their customer base becoming
disillusioned with these developments—seemingly believing that
movements that focus on locality and small businesses will keep their
customers spending.257 It seems their theory will soon be put to the test
since in 2010, Starbucks announced it would be removing all pay
mechanisms from its Wi-Fi access and would be allowing unrestricted free
access.258
Despite nearly ten years of technological development and
consumer demand, there is still no clear consensus on Wi-Fi pricing
structure. While it would seem that customers would vastly prefer free WiFi rather than have it tacked on as an extra charge of staying in a hotel
room, for example, consumers are apparently willing to pay for Wi-Fi as a
matter of convenience. Despite being a pioneer of commercial Wi-Fi
application, Starbucks resisted the movement to free Wi-Fi until last year,
when it suddenly reversed its policy. Meanwhile, small businesses seem to
now be eschewing free Wi-Fi in the hopes of lowering their costs, hoping
that their supporters will stay loyal anyway. As to how this impacts
consumer expectations, consumers may not be sure what the pricing
structure will be, and where will receive free access.259
Whether it is the expectations of bloggers, the question of whether
predictions about the future can be monetized, or how access to legal
research materials should be apportioned, the same questions of
commodification and conflicting expectations run throughout all of these
examples. We have seen that commodification is not necessarily bad – in
virtual work, in fact, it may be a necessity to ensure that workers receive
a living wage, and in prediction markets, money is an effective motivator
for gathering data. However, disputes tend to occur when one group
comes to a contractual relationship believing that they are participating in
a non-commodified website, when really the creators of the website may
have something commodified in mind. From these lessons, we turn next
to the larger doctrinal and theoretical implications of cyber
255
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commodification.
VI.

The Implications of Cyber Commodification

To this point, this Article has focused on elaborating various facets
of the concept of cyber commodification. How cyber commodification
differs from other forms; the forces propelling cyber commodification; the
process by which it takes place; and the contests that have arisen over this
topic. In each of these sections, I have endeavored to provide examples
of how different aspects of monetization or non-monetization – predicting
it, policing it, advocating for one situation or another – has been fairly
confounding. In this section, I want to extrapolate several larger
theoretical points that can be drawn from the examples that I have spun
out.
First, it is of note that the issues surrounding cyber
commodification are similar in some respects to the debate in intellectual
property law about creating proper incentives for creators by protecting IP
rights, while at the same time allowing for experimentation, parody, fair
use, and open access. This central conflict is played out in many of the
debates over open access material versus the drive to copyright. 260 Similar
argumentative tropes might be analogous in the context of cyber
commodification as well. The problem, however, is slightly different as
the value generated from various collaborative activities comes from the
wisdom of the crowd, and the aggregation of talents and opinions, rather
than the work of an individual creator seeking intellectual property
protection for an personal invention.
Second, rather than looking at the issue in cold or impersonal
market rhetoric, it is important to recognize commodification as a more
human sociological issue. As noted by Viviana Zelizer in The Social
Meaning of Money, ―[w]hile money does serve as a key rational tool of
the modern economic market, it also exists outside the sphere of the
market and is profoundly influenced by cultural and social structures.‖ 261
In her book, Collateral Knowledge, Professor Annelise Riles provides
further anthropological insights into the social construction of markets. 262
Riles argues persuasively that market components, such as the notion of
collateral, may function as substitutes for personal knowledge of the
counterparty to a transaction or elaborate dispute resolution
mechanisms. 263 These insights are important to understanding another
point raised by Professor Zelizer:
Clearly, a link is missing in the traditional approach to
money.
Impressed by the fungible, impersonal
260
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characteristics of money, classic theorists emphasized its
instrumental rationality and apparently unlimited capacity
to transform products, relationships, and sometimes even
emotions into an abstract and objective numerical
equivalent. But money is neither culturally neutral nor
socially anonymous. It may well ―corrupt‖ values and
convert social ties into numbers, but values and social
relations reciprocally transmute money by investing it
with meaning and social patterns. 264
In other words, some of the cyber-exchanges that I have been discussing
at various points in the Article may help us make sense of the larger web
of collaborative knowledge that better communication and technology
have made possible. With these observations, I want to turn now to
examine some thoughts about cyber commodification, first on the
doctrinal level of contract law and then on a broader macro level.
A. Doctrinal Implications of Cyber Commodification for Contract Law
As for some of the legal disputes about commodification raised in
earlier parts of the paper, we may want to look to well-known doctrines of
contract law to help us resolve many of these questions. So, in an earlier
part of the paper, I discussed the fact that there are some services, such as
mapping programs and social networking that may allow users free
access, but then dictate particular terms of use through adhesive end user
license agreements that no one reads. Also, there are situations, such as
the Huffington Post bloggers example, where clashing notions of whether
the relationship was or should be commodified have caused conflict.
Some virtual activity is obviously paid work, but other types blur the lines
between work and leisure. This permeable boundary leads to disputes.
The traditional doctrines of contract law may be useful in
analyzing these varied situations. The ancient doctrine of consideration,
which I alluded to previously, may provide one mode of analysis. We
would ask here whether a bargained-for-exchange exists between websites
and users. In many instances, a website might be providing users with
valuable services, but they may not receive anything directly in return
from the users. In a peer production model in which the user does not
pay to use the platform, it might at first seem that there is no
consideration and therefore no binding contract. On the other hand, in a
peer production model, the website is gaining control, in many instances,
of the content that a person is posting, and that content is extremely
valuable, since it serves to build the value of the site, and to attract other
users. The power of many of these websites comes from the crowd, and
the ability to attract others to use the service. Further, if a website is
gathering information about its users so that it can have information for
advertisers or use that information in other ways, that might qualify as
264
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receiving something tangibly valuable for consideration purposes under
existing caselaw. 265
Other contractual rubrics may also be helpful for resolving
disputes. One such possibility would be the doctrine of good faith and
fair dealing; another would be unjust enrichment. While not strictly
contractual, unjust enrichment theories focus on a quantum meruit or
restitutionary measure of recovery when one party has unjustly enriched
another, and no contract is present. 266 The doctrine recognizes that
technically assent is missing, and that contractual bargaining has been
defective, but nonetheless, unfairness has occurred and one party has been
enriched. 267 In other words, many cases in this area discuss the
―hypothetical bargain‖ model, i.e. what would the parties have decided if
they could turn back time and we could assume that they behaved in a
rational way toward each other? Even though the bloggers lost this
argument at the trial court level, one assumes that the founders of the
Huffington Post would have rather had the content from the bloggers,
even if they would (retroactively) have to consider paying them, and that
the bloggers may well have assented under those circumstances.
Further, a question that will be increasingly important to ask is how to
facilitate drawing the distinction between those who are participating in
crowdsourcing websites or other virtual work for fun and in some unpaid
capacity even though some of their services might be paid in another
context (such as editing in Wikipedia) and those who are opting to work in
the market economy and thus arguably should receive the traditional legal
protections for employment activity (clickworkers clicking away on
Amazon‘s Mechanical Turk). As it currently stands, this distinction is
notoriously difficult to draw. 268
One solution would be to leave the issue in the regime of voluntary,
contractual private ordering. If the majority of users participate just for
fun, that might weigh in favor of the default rule being no regulation, with
an opt-in to the protections of labor and employment law. On the other
hand, one could argue that the default rule should be protection, and then
users must deliberately and unequivocally state they are volunteers,
acknowledge that they will not receive monetary payment, and clearly opt
out. In my view, the later approach – requiring an extremely clear opt
out – is the better approach. Considering the differential bargaining
power often at issue in employment situations – which is why certain legal
protections exist – it may make more sense to create a default rule of
265
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regulation, with clear assent needed in order to disclaim the protections.
Of course, this runs the risk of making the opt-out process potentially
burdensome for those looking for fun and not looking to be bogged down
with legalities. One way to deal with the opt-out would be to include it in
the form clickwrap agreements that users must necessarily agree to in
order to use many websites, receive free downloads, or order products. 269
This is the format that many businesses currently use on websites, and it
would, at the very least, provide some sort of notice as to what type of
legal category / relationship the user was entering.
This is merely one suggestion, however, and it is far from perfect.
First, our minimum wage law, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 270 is
an immutable default rule – normally it cannot be waived. After all, if
employers and employees could ―opt out‖ of the minimum wage, that
would undercut its very existence. Companies might choose to exploit
such an exemption opportunistically, not just to apply to those who
participate as volunteers and for entertainment. Using Facebook to get
back in touch with old friends could be a ―hobby,‖ but getting users to do
work on translating portions of the website looks more like the traditional
―work‖ that one would assume the company‘s employees would typically
handle.
As I have noted before in previous work, there are serious critiques of
clickwrap licenses themselves. 271
Clickwrap ―agreements‖ are
problematic because they incorporate some of the worst characteristics of
adhesion contracts, allowing for ―acceptance‖ or ―rejection‖ of the terms
as a whole only on a take it or leave it basis with no negotiation on behalf
of the user. 272 Some of the boilerplate terms contained in online
agreements is so harsh or one-sided that it would likely be held
In ―browsewrap‖ contracts, certain contractual
unenforceable. 273
provisions are found only by visiting another portion of the website. 274
Courts have hesitated to enforce browsewraps because of the very real
problem of lack of assent – if the user was not on notice that these terms
even existed, it is difficult to think of them as being part of a voluntary
contract. 275 Further, given worker‘s lack of knowledge of basic rights
governing the employment relationship, 276 it is problematic to assume that
workers will understand the legalese associated with a clickwrap or
browsewrap.
269
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Given the existing problems with online contracting, what other
models might we look to for answers? As I have noted in previous
writing, there are several factors that should be given a prominent role in
any determination of whether online activity is ―work‖ and subject to
regulation under FLSA. 277
Is such activity being monetized and
commodified? If that is case, perhaps commodification is an indication
that the activity should properly be classified as paid work. Another
factor might be whether the work is ―de-skilled‖ work. In such
situations, the potential for exploitation might be higher, and thus the
protections of the FLSA might be more important.
Finally, since the Department of Labor may choose to regulate this
activity in the near future, it might make sense for private employers that
are experimenting with this type of work – and the websites that facilitate
them – to attempt a self-regulatory response in order to frame the dialogue
if in fact an extension of the FLSA is proposed, which seems likely. One
such response might be to construct a code of ―best practices‖ for
cyberwork that attempted to draw some of the lines between work and
entertainment activity, and set out some guidelines that would prevent the
more extreme forms of exploitation. These ―best practices‖ would be
influential if they formed a coherent set of expectations which both
workers and employers could adhere. If such a voluntary response is
present, the line-drawing exercise necessitated by the FLSA may not be as
difficult as it might first appear.
B. Theoretical Implications of Cyber Commodification
From these practical solutions, I now turn to a more theoretical
discussion of cyber commodification. It is important to note that cyber
commodification has become a controversial area because group
knowledge has particular characteristics that make it unique. After all,
what do crowdsourcing, crowdfunding, prediction markets, and wikipedia
all have in common? They all rely on, indeed could not exist without, the
contributions of a large group of members. That is what is so interesting
about these new businesses, the ones that harness the Internet successfully
in a multitude of ways. What is common between prediction markets and
crowdsourcing is that both acknowledge that large groups, when properly
harnessed, can result in better outcomes than the efforts of individuals. 278
These various websites, programs, and crowdsourcing tools are
only valuable because of their scale. 279 For example, Facebook is at its
most useful when a person attains a critical mass of friends or
acquaintances who are also using it. If a person has zero Facebook
friends, being on Facebook will not be enjoyable, since here will be no
277
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one to read or ―like‖ any posts. In other words, the intrinsic value of the
Facebook site to the individual person depends on how many others in
their social circle are also using it. And the connections, the fun part of
being on Facebook also generate value for the company itself, which can
brag to advertisers about the number of connections generated and the
captive eyeballs on its platform. Like Facebook, so too wikipedia,
craigslist, Amazon‘s Mechanical Turk, and countless other websites that
are either commercial, or not. They depend on vast numbers of eyeballs
and users – in other words, harnessing the collective knowledge, skills,
and time.
In examining these questions, I am largely interested in two legal
theorists, Professors Margaret Jane Radin and Yochai Benkler, whose
work informs and provides structure for the present context. Professor
Radin introduced and developed the theory of commodification in legal
studies in a series of pathbreaking works concerning the commodification
of the body and sexuality. For some years, Professor Benkler has been
writing about open source computing and how networked peer production
would seem to provide a ―third way‖ of non-commodified production,
apart from either markets or the firm, to borrow the terminology from
Coase‘s theory of the firm.
In Contested Commodities, Professor Radin is concerned with how
commodification interacts and perhaps subtracts from what she terms the
conception of personhood. 280 Aside from the theoretical concept of
commodification, which she explores in depth, she is also concerned with
subordination, objectificiation, and the inequitable distribution of wealth
within society. In fact, one question she raises is whether these other ills
are the real concern, not commodification itself. 281 Radin does not
espouse either one of these dualities precisely, and she mostly
concentrates on commodification as it interacts with the sale of the body
and related elements. As such, she focuses not so much on the dichotomy
between commodification and non-commodification, but with the concept
of human flourishing.
Although Radin declares that she does not believe in setting up a
binary opposition between ―universal commodification‖ and complete
―non-commodification,‖ she hints at various points throughout the book
that commodification is dangerous. Although Professor Radin formally
claims that she believes in discourse pluralism, the more examples she
provides, the more the reader becomes convinced that commodification is
a problem. In her view, we are on a slippery slope of commodification
that will chip away at our dignity, and ultimately our personhood as we
slip our way down the slope. This is despite the fact that much of
―woman‘s work‖ has been undervalued precisely because it is outside the
realm of the marketplace.
In his book, The Wealth of Networks and an accompanying law
review article, 282 Professor Yochai Benkler focuses on the potential for
280
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MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 154 (1996).
Id. at 155.
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collaborative work in cyberspace. 283
Both in the book and an
accompanying law review article, Professor Benkler regales the reader
with rich descriptions of the Linux operating system, wikipedia, Project
Guttenberg, and the NASA Mars project.
In all of these online
endeavors, users coordinate their efforts through collaboration by using
small segments of their time, talents, or computing power. In Benkler‘s
vision, this ―peer production‖ model presents another option for economic
coordination (in addition to Coase‘s description of markets and firms)
when certain conditions are met. Throughout both the book and the law
review article, it is no secret that Professor Benkler strongly advocates for
the importance of the peer production model. According to Professor
Benkler, money does not (and moreover should not) play into the
motivations of the participants. Rather, he claims, users are motivated by
intellectual joy, pride, excellence, giving back to the community, and
other similar non-monetary interests. While Professor Benkler mostly
assumes that the users‘ interests and those of the creators match, he does
occasionally allude to the idea of moral hazard.
In Professor Benkler‘s view, peer production stands the best
chance of succeeding when the model is able to take into account the
differing interests, talents, and capabilities of the users. Projects that
allow for users to harness their talents and match them with available
tasks, Benkler suggests, will be the most efficient for the peer production
model. Benkler identifies two additional critieria for successful peer
production: granularity, which will allow for only a small task and a small
commitment of time or effort, and, second, modularity, which allows for
those discrete elements to be both successfully broken down and then later
integrated into the larger project. While Professors Radin and Benkler
approach the problem quite differently – Radin from a feminist
perspective, Benkler from an open source advocacy perspective – both
seem to view commodification with suspicion.
No theory to date explains why harnessing collective knowledge in
cyberspace results in the presence of Wikipedia, and simultaneously,
prediction markets. Both do aggregate knowledge, but one is explicitly
free, relying solely on the goodwill of volunteer editors and a few
donated dollars, while prediction markets are built around the central
theme that money is the only element that matters. How do we reconcile
these conflicting models? How do we recognize that bloggers may view
their contributions differently in varying situations, and that they are
unhappy when their expectations about monetization are not met by the
blog‘s operators?
Overall, both Professors Radin and Benkler have made outstanding
contributions to commodification theory but at the same time seem
See also Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer Production, 11
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963 (2009).
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skeptical of monetizing information on the Internet. While I understand
their suspicion, the world of cyber commodification is so diverse that a
rule of absolute non-commodification would do at least some of these new
forms of collaboration a disservice. For example, payment is important in
virtual work to prevent exploitation of workers, especially disenfranchised
ones in the Third World. A norm of non-commodification does not take
the rather unique status of these Third World workers into account.
Money also may help us attain more accurate results in prediction
markets.
What is it that markets do that perhaps other forms are not able to
do? Markets, after all, perform an allocative function as well as a
coordination task. A market orders and organizes what would otherwise
be random activity. Money might incentivize people to reveal their
knowledge. Further, a living wage for work performed is important.
Contrary to what both Professors Radin and Benkler seem to advocate,
money itself is not the problem in some of the scenarios set out in this
Article. 284 In fact, the lack of money for work on the Internet – especially
when it concerns the meager wages paid to Third World workers in a
crowdsourcing scheme – can smack more of exploitation than free
collaboration.
One way to look at this is as a coordination problem. As we know
from Coase‘s theory of the firm, both markets and firms are ways of
efficiently organizing economic activity. So what motivates people in a
non-commodified crowdsourcing situation? The question of motivation is
far more complicated than homos economius would have us believe. 285
There is a complicated series of motivations that drive any one person,
including a mixture of altruism and of self-interest. Further, while certain
tasks might be feely volunteered, other tasks are simply too boring,
mundane, annoying, or time-intensive that people will not do them unless
they are paid.
Despite the warnings from Professors Benkler and Radin about
commodification, there are certain areas where we should not be worried
about monetization, but instead we should be worried about nonmonetization. So failing to pay workers minimum wage online should not
be praised as a new method of peer production – it should be viewed
skeptical, in some instances even condemned in the even that it leads to
exploitation. Those who change the expectations of users halfway through
a relationship due to moral hazard and the lure of money should not have
their own expectations respected. At the same time, participants in social
entrepreneurship or a prediction market will likely benefit from having a
monetary exchange as part of their freedom of expression. There is no
reason to fear these forms of exchanges just because they involve money.
Returning to Professor Zelizer‘s point, money may influence society, but
society influences money as well. Perhaps through efforts such as social
284
See Yochai Benkler & Helen Nissenbaum, Commons-based Peer Production and Virtue, 14 J. OF
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entrepreneurship, we can change the way we think about the very concept
of monetization.
Therefore, I would suggest that, unlike the Delaware Chancery
Court, we do not have to choose between the wholly monetized model of
eBay and the public-service world of craigslist. Instead of imposing
choices, dichotomies, and artificial categories to these new forms of
collaboration and business organization, we should allow entrepreneurs,
social or otherwise, the freedom to experiment, explore, and choose
different models. This means, however, that websites should be free not
only to implement a philanthropic or social business model, but also to use
money to motivate their participants, such as in virtual work or within
prediction markets. But when doing so, we must keep in mind Professor
Radin‘s particular admonition: will any particular activity in cyberspace
add in total to the sum of human flourishing?
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, our journey across the Internet shows us that
cyberspace is currently in a state of incomplete commodification. 286 The
current landscape of cyberspace contains multiple regimes of
commodified, non-commodified, and mixed-use settings. This mixture –
which in many instances defies logic or common sense – tells us that there
is no one natural ―state of nature‖ for the Internet. If anything, the
development of certain intermediate business models like social
entrepreneurship can potentially reframe the ways that we look at the
nature of markets and the theory of the firm.

